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Abstract
The political transformation and transition of post-Soviet societies have led to hybrid
structures in political, economic and technological domains. In such hybrid structures the
roles of government, state enterprise, private business and civil society are not clearly
defined. These roles shift depending on formal and informal interests, availability and
competition for limited resources, direct and indirect financial benefits, internal and
external agendas.
In an abstract sense, a hybrid is "anything derived from heterogeneous sources, or
composed of elements of different or incongruous kinds" (Hybrid). If transition is a process
from one state to another, hybrid is a state unto itself. In the context of this thesis Hybrid
Socio-Technical Environment means the co-existence of different institutions and policies,
state and private business entities, old and new technologies, managerial models and
practices of planning and market economies, collectivist and individualist value systems.
Rapid technological progress, coupled with shifts in political and economic structures, may
produce long-lasting disturbances in a society. Such disturbances are result of the hybrid
society's contradictory nature. Some of these disturbances appear in the form of large-scale
systemic accidents, such as the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power Station
accident.
The rigid and outdated Soviet socio-technical system was broken down into multiple
independent systems and subsystems to increase operational flexibility, with very limited
capital investment. A twenty-year transition period (1990-2010), proved the survivability
of the Soviet system, which was able to perform its primary functions even with partial
capacity.
However, recent large-scale accidents are clear signs that the system is stretching beyond
its limits. Changes in the socio-technical landscape (multiple stakeholders and variety of
interests) suggest that the traditional approaches of Reliability Theory, with its inward
focus, may not be an effective tool in identifying emerging challenges. The outward-focused
System theory approach takes into consideration key characteristics of the changing hybrid
socio-technical landscape, as well as motivations of multiple stakeholders.
The research concludes that insufficient capital investment and backlog in maintenance
shifts are key systemic factors that allow migration of organizational behavior from a safe
to an unsafe state. Additional analysis has to be conducted to prove this conclusion.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
"Ultimate truth and the consciousness perceiving it are like water put in water,
indifferentiable" (Dalai Lama).
1.1 Motivation
Over the last three decades the world has experienced dramatic technological
transformation. Speed and abundance of information; complexity of decision-making
systems; dissemination of knowledge and instant access to new and low- cost technologies;
mobility of capital, labor and ideas are changing the world around us. Such changes are
even more obvious in the developing world.
Technological shift is also visible in the post-Soviet landscape. Here, however, technological
progress has been coupled with a shift in the political system. Such coupling has created
long-lasting disturbances in society, where the borders of responsibility between
government, private sector and civil society are still in the process of transitional formation
and not clearly defined. The political transformation and transition of post-Soviet societies
have led to hybrid structures in political, economic and technological domains.
In an abstract sense, a hybrid is "anything derived from heterogeneous sources, or
composed of elements of different or incongruous kinds" (Hybrid). If transition is a process
from one state to another, hybrid is a state unto itself. In the context of this thesis Hybrid
Socio-Technical Environment means co-existence of different institutions and policies, state
and private business entities, old and new technologies, managerial models and practices
of planning and market economies, collectivist and individualist value systems.
Rapid technological progress, coupled with shifts in political and economic structures, may
produce long-lasting disturbances in a society. Such disturbances are the result of the
hybrid society's contradictory nature. Some of these disturbances could be in the form of
large-scale systemic accidents, such as the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power
Station accident.
The goal of this thesis is to explain such hybrid characteristics through a vital sector of a
planned economy - the electricity sector - using the particular example of the Sayano-
Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power Station accident.
Twenty years after splintering into fifteen national entities, the Soviet industrial
infrastructure is facing physical decay and the constant challenge of the market economy.
The rigid and outdated Soviet socio-technical system was broken into multiple
independent systems and subsystems to increase operational flexibility, with very limited
capital investment.
Until recently the electricity generation sector, prioritized by communist ideology and a
lynchpin of the Soviet political economy, remained a reliable industry. Despite mounting
challenges, the governments of Eurasia continue to rely on this sector for rapid economic
recovery by keeping electricity costs for national industries below market price.
"On September 17, 2009 an accident shut down the Sayano-Shushenskaya
Hydroelectric Power Station, Russia's single largest power facility, with an installed
capacity of 6,721 megawatts (MW), which typically produces about 24.5 billion
kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity annually. This represents about 2.4 percent of
Russia's total electricity production and about 3 percent of Russia's installed
generating capacity. The facility generated about 11-12 percent of the power
supplied to the Siberian integrated regional grid system, which stretches from east
to west about 3,000 km, from the Russian-Chinese border east of Lake Baikal to the
oil-producing area of West Siberia "(Sagers, Freedenberg, & Mahnovski, 2009).
"Turbine 2, the oldest among 10 turbines at the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydro Power
Station (SSHPS), was ripped from its seating at 8:13 am on August 17, 2009. Within
seconds, a deluge of water began flooding the facility's turbine hall and engine
rooms, causing a transformer explosion and short circuiting, crippling the plant's
electrical systems as well as causing devastating structural damage. Fortunately the
hydro plant's 245.5m-tall arch gravity dam was not breached. Management failures
and technical shortcomings were blamed the disaster, in which 75 people died"
(Fleming, 2009).
SSHPS is the largest power plant in Russia and the sixth-largest hydro station in the world.
It produced 15% of Siberia's and 2% of Russia's total generation, with generation capacity
of 6.4GW. SSHPS is part of the Yenisei hydro cascade. Within the Siberian Energy System
the station is the major source for stabilizing peak power fluctuation.
Construction of the station started in 1968 and ended, after significant delay, in 1988. Prior
to this accident, the SSHPS had experienced three major accidents - all related to seasonal
floods - in 1979, 1985, 1988. Construction of the Shore spillway, originally postponed due
to lack of funds, began in 2005 and was completed one year after the accident, in
September 2010 (RusHydro, September 28, 2010).
SSHPS's parent company RusHydro's market capitalization was $10 billion as of July 2009.
At the end of that year total installed hydropower capacity was 25,336.6 MW. It has 50
hydro plants, including the largest - the SSHPS. In 2008 the company generated
80,273 GWh of electricity (International Water Power and Dam Construction, 2009).
RusHydro is a state-controlled power generation holding with 60.37% (RusHydro, 2010)
ownership of the Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimuschestvo).
Minority stakes are in the hands of Russia's aluminum producing conglomerate, RUSAL.
The magnitude of the accident and the symbolism of this particular power station as a
premier Soviet industrial accomplishment present a rare opportunity for reconsidering
existing mental models of safety and creating an awareness that "accidents are complex
processes involving the entire socio-technical system" (Leveson, 2009).
1.2 Hypothesis and Objectives
The hypothesis of this thesis can be summarized in the three following paragraphs:
In hybrid socio-technical landscape the roles of government, state enterprise, private
business and civil society are not clearly defined. Their roles fluctuate depending on
formal and informal interests, availability and competition for limited resources,
direct and indirect financial benefits, and internal and external agendas.
After the fall of The Soviet Union its rigid and outdated socio-technical system was
broken down into multiple independent systems and subsystems to increase
operational flexibility, with very limited capital investment. A twenty-year transition
period (1990-2010) demonstrated the durability and survivability of the Soviet
system, which continued to perform its primary functions even at partial capacity.
"Failures of some or a majority of system components lead only to gradual
degradation of the system's ability to perform its functions/operations" (Ushakov,
2000).
However, recent large-scale accidents are clear signs that the system is reaching its
limits. Changes in the socio-technical landscape (multiple stakeholders and variety of
interests) suggest that traditional approaches of the Reliability theory, with its
inward focus, may not be an effective tool to identify emerging challenges. The
outward System theory approach takes into consideration key characteristics of the
changing hybrid socio-technical landscape, as well as the motivations of multiple
stakeholders.
The objective of this thesis is to bring clarity to three different domains: (1) mental models,
(2) the powerlessness of management, and (3) the sustainability of infrastructure.
Structure of mental models dictates our behavior and language and constrains how we
construct reality
By structure I mean first and foremost the structure of mental models of decision makers.
In the post-Soviet society a system is associated with a hierarchical structure with an
individual being at the very bottom of the hierarchy, whereas the system typically implies a
political system or political regime.
Personal inability to resist the political system has left the legacy of old mindsets in which
people subconsciously focus attention on particular individuals (heroes or villains) rather
than systemic problems. The old Stalinist saying "replace the person, solve the problem"
(net cheloveka, net problemy) suggests that the easiest and most frequently used
explanation in accident investigations is human error.
In addition, language presents another barrier in presenting the System Theory and System
Safety approach. As Dekker states, our language constrains how we construct reality. I will
address this issue in more detail in Chapter 2. But, as a brief example, let's look at several
translation dilemmas:
The word safety (bezopasnost') has dual translation in the Russian language as both
security and safety. Thus Public safety (obschestvennaya bezopasnost') is often translated
and understood as domestic or internal security. The closest translation to System safety is
probably safety/security of the system (bezopasnost'systemy), which also has a self-
protective security connotation.
Even in narrow technical language security of technology (technicheskaya bezopasnost') is
often associated with security from outside threats and factors. The term industrial
security/safety (promyshlennaya bezopasnost') is referred to physical processes within an
industrial site, whereas reliability (nadyozhnost') refers to internal characteristics of a
system.
Just this small example suggests that there must be a considerable gap between the
individual and a system in which the individual is estranged from the system and the role
of each individual is limited. What could be safe for the system may not necessarily be safe
for individual and vice versa. The safety of the individual is not connected to the
safety/security or reliability of the system.
The powerlessness of management to react to emerging unsafe situations is one of the key
factors in systematic migration of organizational behavior
This thesis employs three major sources of information: (1) the report of the official
investigation conducted by the Federal Service for Environment, Technological and Atomic
Inspection (FSETAI) (Rostekhnadzor, 2009) and Russia's Ministry for Emergency
immediately after the accident, (2) the official parliamentary report (Council of Federation,
2009a) and (3) special opinions of 45 experts, attached to the Parliamentary Report
(Council of Federation, 2009b), which may not reflect the official position.
Three other sources of reference that helped to reconstruct a full picture of the accident
are: (1) publicly available information of RusHydro (owner of the SSHPS), (2) press
coverage in the national and regional media and (3) discussion in the Russian blogosphere.
I would like to stress that the Russian-speaking blogosphere is a natural extension of its
growing civil society. Instant and active discussion, the sharing of information and sources,
photographs and witness accounts on numerous chat and blog platforms (most visibly Live
Journal and forum.dron.ru) left the government with no choice but to make public
investigation reports of both FSETAI and Parliamentary Commission available.
Study of these six sources of information suggests a preliminary conclusion that middle
management was aware of the problem at the station. Moreover, in hindsight, the expert
community was not terribly surprised by the accident. Thus the problem had been brewing
for some time. It is not the absence of awareness, but rather powerlessness to react to an
emerging unsafe situation, that allows for the systematic migration of organizational
behavior.
In this thesis I will try to differentiate how much of this powerlessness could be attributed
to the limited availability of legal and regulatory instruments, as opposed to lack of safety
culture. However, it seems that insufficient capital investment and backlog in maintenance
shifts are key systemic factors that allow migration of organizational behavior from a safe
to an unsafe state.
Developing a clear framework of Sustainability of Critical Infrastructure could increase public
awareness of socio-technical landscape and system safety.
Over the last decade a lot has been said and written about the sustainable use of
environmental resources. The public today has some degree of awareness of
environmental changes that are taking place around us. I believe that a similar approach
could be used in increasing awareness about the sustainability of critical infrastructure. By
critical infrastructure I mean infrastructure such as electrical power systems, railroads,
public utilities, highways etc. that allows society to function safely and effectively for the
benefit of its members.
Rapid changes in societies may offer new, efficient and fast technological improvements
such as new software for power management, highway traffic management or water
purification systems. However, unless significant investments are made in the maintenance
and modernization of physical infrastructure, such improvements can stretch the existing
rigid critical infrastructure to its limits, with devastating consequences.
Public understanding of existing infrastructural limits, awareness of the social-technical
landscape and system safety may theoretically lead to higher public investment in
infrastructure (which often requires increase in taxation), an increased mandate to the
government with regard to strengthening the regulatory environment in the private sector,
as well as coupling investment incentives with investment obligations for the private
sector. Such processes will also lead to regulatory changes and, in particular, to price
regulations, i.e. how tariffs are being calculated and approved. One reason for
underinvestment is the low profitability of infrastructure companies since capital
investments are made from net profits.
1.3 Objective of the Thesis
System safety is uncharted water for many contemporary policy makers in the former
Soviet Union. The thesis research will attempt to develop a System Safety Framework that
can be integrated into public policy, market regulation and insurance sectors across
Eurasia. In this context I will study Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power
Station accident of August 17, 2009 as the most recent and most severe accident in terms of
economic and human consequences.
The objective of the research is to describe the process of migration from a safe to an
unsafe environment using the System Theory approach. The dynamics of systematic
migration will include a survey of the political, legislative, economic and cultural factors
that allowed such migration to take place.
The magnitude and symbolic importance of the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power
Station accident present an opportunity to define important and long-lasting lessons for
decision makers. It also represents an opportunity to increase public awareness concerning
the sustainability of critical infrastructure, the socio-technical landscape and system safety
in general.
1.4 Thesis Approach and Structure
Chapter Two: Rigidity of Reliability Theory vs. Dynamics of System Theory
This chapter will compare and contrast Reliability Theory and System Theory. The
Reliability Approach was developed by engineers for the needs of a rigid twentieth-century
state-planned economy and military-industrial complex. I argue that System Theory is
better suited to the hybrid dynamic environment of Eurasia, which in this case refers to the
geographical, geopolitical, infrastructural and socio-economic and cultural domain of
former Soviet Union.
This chapter will also address issues of Language, Concept and Mental Models that define
the framework of the discussion and its key terminology.
It is important to define terminology, its boundaries and relevance to the discussion. In the
first part of this chapter I will describe key differences in translation and different
contextual environments in which words are used. I will also attempt to explain how
language affects our mental models in analyzing and describing safety.
Context definition will be followed by a brief introduction of System Theory and key
principles of system safety. A short historical and literature review will be added to
strengthen the base, and define the parameters, of discussion. Finally, I will return to the
subject of terminology-mapping vocabulary and concepts that are necessary for further
discussion.
The next three chapters of the thesis will build knowledge around this particular accident
through a Hierarchy Theory approach that structures a system into different levels of
complexity. This analytical approach focuses on abstract properties and "the fundamental
difference between one level of complexity and another. Its ultimate aim is to explain the
relationship between different levels: what generates levels, what separates them, and
what links them" (Leveson, 2009).
The system-safety approach employs key principles of Hierarchical Theory in which safety
is an emergent property. In simple words, this means that safe or unsafe operations may
emerge as the result of relations between different levels of hierarchy. In such multilevel
co-existence higher levels of hierarchy set conditions for the safe or unsafe behaviors of
lower levels. Since most such dynamics are non-linear, the interaction of lower-level
components may in turn affect the constraints of higher levels of complexity.
In the case of SSHPS, each higher level of hierarchy - starting from Russia's United Energy
System down - imposed constraints on each lower level of hierarchy. On the other hand,
operations on the lower levels of hierarchy result in a higher level of complexity. If we
abstract from a specific socio-technical level of the SSHPS accident to core principles
system safety framework, we can look at the accident through the level prism (Leveson,
2009):
Level 1: Chain of Events;
Level 2: Conditions that Led to Such Events; and
Level 3: Systemic Factors that Allowed Such Conditions to Emerge Over Time.
LEVEL 3 SYSTEMIC FACTORS
LEVEL 2 CONDITIONS
EVENTS OR ACCIDENT MECHANISM
Figure 1: Hierarchical Model (Leveson, 2009)
Chapter Three: System Boundary and Chain of Events
Defining the chain of events is just the first step in understanding proximate processes.
This is important, but not sufficient, in understanding the accident. I will provide the reader
with key facts about SSH PS's system legacy, and its major design flaws, that are critical to
overall analysis. I will then describe the evolution of the system boundary over time.
Finally, readers will be presented with a description of proximate events at SSHPS prior
and during the accident.
SSHPS has two complementary - and contradictory - goals: (1) generation of electricity and
(2) stabilization of the regional energy grid. The origins of these goals are rooted in the
evolution and disintegration of a super-system (Siberian energy system) into several inter-
dependent systems as the result of the liberalization process that took place over the last
decade.
The conflict of goals between the RusHydro holding and the Siberian Regional Energy Grid
System, each with its separate goals and operational priorities, is one of the critical
dynamics that was not anticipated by the system's original Soviet design engineers in the
1970s.
Chapter Four: Conditions
The purpose of this chapter is to employ a Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process -
or STAMP - to analyze the SSHPS accident. We discussed hierarchical theory in the previous
chapter. Complex systems are analyzed on different levels. STAMP presents an accident
from multiple analytical positions. STAMP allows us to be flexible, to set multiple viewing
points in terms of time, to visualize hierarchical levels and proximity to the event.
I will take my readers through seven levels of operations, starting from the operational
service of the SSHSP and ending with the Federal Safety Agency (FSETAI). On every level, I
will try to apply the STAMP model's clear and simple steps, as developed and described by
Professor Nancy Leveson (2009):
1. Safety requirements and constraints;
2. Controls;
3. Context;
4. Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions;
5. Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions.
Chapter Five: Socio-Technical Landscape
The goal of this chapter is to briefly describe the evolution of the Soviet and, later, Russian
electricity sector before and after 2000. For this purpose I will build two causal-loop
models to identify, describe and compare key dynamics that are of interest to this research.
Unfortunately the scope and availability of data do not allow building an actual system
dynamics model. Such a model will require extensive research capabilities that are
presently unavailable.
In this chapter I also will map Russia's decision-making and legislative processes; the
evolution of the regional governments' role in public utility management; and the
fundamental role of electricity generation sector in Russia's economy. I'll provide an
overview of ten years of liberalization reforms (1992-2008) in the sector and its future
perspectives, and address delays caused by the dynamics of Russia's legal and regulatory
environments.
Chapter Six: Conclusion
The research will present a hierarchical structure of accident factors identified in time and
space. The main deliverable of the thesis is to construct a "spatial picture" of a single
accident in order to focus the attention of Eurasian policy makers on the problem of
sustaining critical infrastructure and the socio-technical nature of complex accidents.
The deliverable can be transmitted directly via summary translated into Russian and/or
indirectly by sharing the finding with international financial institutions (IFI), such as The
World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development
Bank, etc., which are actively involved in financing infrastructural projects in Eurasia.
The research may also have limited commercial application for private financial
institutions involved in insuring complex infrastructure in the region, as well as for
multinational corporations interested in building or upgrading complex infrastructural
systems in Eurasia.
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Chapter 2. Rigidity of Reliability Theory vs. Dynamics of System
Theory
"While a system traditionally is modeled by decomposition into structural
elements, the dynamic behavior ofsystems and actors is modeled by
decomposition of the behavioralflow into events" (Jens Rasmussen).
This chapter compares and contrasts Reliability Theory and System Theory. The Reliability
Approach was developed by engineers for the needs of a rigid twentieth-century state
planned economy and military-industrial complex. I argue that System Theory is better
suited to the hybrid dynamic environment of Eurasia, which in this case refers to the
geographical, geopolitical, infrastructural and socio-economic and cultural domain of the
former Soviet Union.
This chapter will address issues of language, concept and mental models that define the
discussion's framework and key terminology. It is important to define terminology, and to
establish its parameters and relevance to the discussion. In the first part of this chapter I
will describe key characteristics of the Reliability Theory and provide a brief historical
overview. I will also attempt to explain how language affects our mental models in
analyzing and describing safety.
Context definition will be followed by a brief introduction of System Theory and key
principles of system safety. A brief conceptual introduction will strengthen the base and
define the parameters of discussion. To illustrate a comparison of Reliability and System
Theories more fully, I will briefly discuss SSHPS initial design within the context of Soviet
expansion in Siberia. Finally, I will map five major gaps between the two approaches,
stressing that System Theory approach allows us to detect and accurately characterize the
changing dynamics of a hybrid socio-technical landscape.
2.1 Overview of the Evolution of Reliability Theory in the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has long been a stronghold of Reliability Theory. The Russian school of
Reliability Theory dates from the late 1950s - early 1960s. The first Union-level conference
on reliability took place in 1958, one year after the launch of Sputnik. By that time it was
clear that the rapidly expanding Soviet military industrial complex demanded new
scientific frameworks.
By the late 1950s several unofficial research groups had been formed in aerospace and
navy research centers in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities. This process gained official
recognition when the school's founder, Professor Gnedenko, founded a reliability seminar
at Moscow State University that grew into an 800 member collaborative community of
mathematicians, statisticians, physicists and engineers. Gnedenko, Belyaev and Solovyev
published their first work on reliability, Mathematical Methods in Reliability Theory, in
1965, the same year Barlow and Proschan published their Mathematical Theory of
Reliability in New York (Ushakov, 2000).
In 1970, Kozlov and Ushakov published Reliability Handbook, which together with
Mathematical Methods in Reliability Theory became table books for engineers across the
USSR and dominated conceptual thinking for years to come. In the same year Professor
Ushakov, founder of the Gnedenko e-Forum, the International Group on Reliability,
presented milestone works of the Soviet/Russian school of Reliability Theory in his key-
note lecture Reliability: Past, Present, Future.
As the Cold War increased its pace, this school of thought expanded its influence in the
USSR - Moscow, Leningrad (shipbuilding), Kiev (electronics), Riga (aviation), Irkutsk
(energy), etc.-each specializing in specific areas of the Soviet military industrial complex.
In 1960 by Professor L.A. Melentiev established the Energy Systems Institute at the
Siberian Branch of Soviet Academy of Science. Based in Irkutsk, the institute concentrated
on energy and electricity sector challenges. Its major research topics included theory and
methods of systems studies in the energy sector; study on interrelations between the
economy and energy; scientific and methodological support of energy programs for Russia,
its regions and areas; theory and methods for comprehensive study and control of
reliability and survivability of the fuel and energy complex and energy systems; theory and
methods for management and control of electric power system operation and
development; theory of hydraulic circuits and methods for mathematical modeling and
optimization of heat-, water-, oil- and gas-supplying systems; theory and methods of
extreme thermodynamics (Voropai).
Let us now summarize the key concepts of Reliability Theory (Ushakov, 2000.; Gnedenko,
Belyaev, & Solovyev, 1969). This is necessary to establish the scope of further discussion:
1. The Reliability Theory: "the overall scientific discipline... that develops general
methods of evaluating the quality of systems from known quantities of their
component parts... The reliability theory establishes the regularity of occurrence of
defects in devices and methods of prediction".
2. Increasing complexity: "Increase in the number of elements leads to decrease in the
reliability of overall performance. But, at the same time, the increasing importance
of tasks carried out by such devices requires their ever-increasing reliability...One of
the most intriguing problems in reliability theory is the development of principles of
design of a complex apparatus that will function even when some of its elements
will not".
3. Effectiveness: "characterizes a system's ability to perform its main functions even
with partial capacity. Failures of some (or even a majority of) system components
lead only to gradual degradation of the system's ability to perform its
functions/operations".
4. Survivability: "a special property of a system to "withstand impacts." These impacts
can be unpredictable inner failures (usually due to operator errors), environmental
influences (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes) or hostile human acts (enemy military
operations or terrorist acts).
5. Safety: "a special property of a system characterizing effective performance of its
main predetermined functions (production of goods, electrical power generation,
gas and oil transportation, etc.) without dangerous environmental consequences for
people and nature. Safety is usually considered in probabilistic terms that are close
to those used in a "pure" reliability analysis".
6. Security: "is sometimes considered as a part of reliability-survivability problem.
Indeed, many systems must not only operate reliably but also at the same time
provide protection against non-sanctioned access".
The Soviet school of Reliability Theory has, over its fifty-year life, proven an enduring and
successful developmental model. Its implementation allowed for the development of a
robust, survivable Soviet infrastructure, which in many respects satisfied the economic and
technical requirements of the planned economy.
One significant characteristic of the Reliability Theory is its focus on the internal
components of a system. The theory analyses a system outside its context. In other words,
human behavior, organizational culture, legal, economic and political environment are all
exogenous factors that have secondary effects on the system.
The inward-focused semantics of the theory suggests that growing complexity could be
resolved by increased reliability of a system's individual components, a decreased number
of defects within the system and ability to predict emergence of errors and accidents.
The focus on "main predetermined functions" rules out the concept that a system may have
emergent and/or unanticipated behavior. The concept of survivability assumes that a
system has to have properties that can allow it to operate even with failed components
and/or with a changed environment around the system.
2.2 Brief Overview of the System Theory
Now, let us define the framework of System Theory. There are three key assumptions
(Leveson, 2009) that System Theory approach challenges:
1. Complexity cannot be addressed with physical decomposition of the system into
separate physical components and decomposition into separate events over time.
Each system, besides its main functions, has emergent behavior.
2. When components are integrated into a system, they become subject to numerous
non-linear interactions, what often are called dynamics or causal-loop interactions.
3. Interaction between sub-systems result in emergent characteristics of complex
systems that cannot be captured by traditional decomposition approaches.
In his Introduction to General System Thinking, Gerald M. Weinberg (1975) suggests three
major systems categories with respect to methods of thinking:
1. Organized simplicity (machines): decomposition into a finite number of
components, where interactions between components are defined and predictable.
2. Organized complexity (systems): "too complex for analysis and too structured for
statistics".
3. Unorganized complexity (aggregates): "systems that are complex, but yet
sufficiently random in their behavior so that they are sufficiently regular to be
studied statistically... Randomness is the property that makes the statistical
calculations come out right".
It is organized complexity that is most difficult for Reliability Theory to capture, from either
a logical or statistical point of view. With technological progress and the growing
interconnectivity of different systems, there is a significant migration of technologies from
organized simplicity to organized complexity.
The Domain of System Theory
Unorganized complexity: can use statistics






Figure 2: Three Categories of Systems (Leveson, 2009)
2.3 Short Excursus Into Evolution of SSHPS
To make our comparison of the Reliability and System Theories more concrete, let us
briefly address SSHPS initial design and purpose. The initially coupled roles of SSHPS,
namely, (1) electricity generation and (2) stability of the Siberian Energy System amid any
disruption, were not clearly separated between state and private interests. I will cover this
subject in greater detail in Chapter 3, which will define the system borders of SSHPS.
The political transformation and transition of post-Soviet societies have led to hybrid
structures in political, economic and technological domains. Transition from a planned to a
market economy has created long-lasting disturbances in societies in which governmental,
private sector and civil society boundaries of responsibility are still in the process of
formation and not clearly defined. The government's role in ownership of critical/strategic
enterprises and infrastructure is creating a conflicting regulatory environment.
SSHPS is an example of the dynamic co-existence of old and new technologies. The digital
revolution and introduction of software into electromechanical subsystems created
additional emergent complex system characteristics unanticipated by its original designers.
The co-existence of old and new technology, coupled with hybrid economic characteristics
(both market and state-interventionist), created a new operational environment, while
mental models and expectations that the system would continue to operate reliably
remained unchanged.
The generation and culture gap between old-school engineers and Russia's new managers
also reduced the ability to learn from previous experience. The station was built for the
purpose of developing Siberia's industrial regions under the rigid demands of a planned
economy; its design did not anticipate the cyclical demands of an emerging market
economy.
On August 17, 2009 both the public and experts were shocked by the news of the accident,
which concerned what was considered a very reliable traditional technology - hydropower
generation. The principles of hydropower have been known since ancient Egypt and
Mesopotamia and could be abstracted in terms of organized simplicity. The reliability of
each component, however complex and powerful, could be calculated and measured.
On the other hand, SSHPS is a complex system. It generates 6.4 gigawatts of electric power,
is part of a larger hydropower cascade that includes two more stations, and plays an
important role of keeping the integrated Siberian Regional Electricity Grid stable.
The system-thinking approach forces us to put the SSHPS into natural, knowledge, human
and economic contexts. The snapshot below shows the dynamics of how different
processes that go through our system are evolved over time and how the system itself is
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Figure 3: Socio-Technical Environment (adapted from Crawley (2007))
2.4 Five Major Gaps Between Two Theories
The socio-technical landscape that surrounds the SSHPS is much more complex and
different from the one for which the station was initially designed. Changes in the socio-
technical landscape suggest that traditional approaches of the Reliability Theory, with its
inward focus, may not be an effective tool to identify emerging challenges. The System
Theory approach, however, takes into consideration both the key characteristics of the
changing hybrid socio-technical landscape and the motivations of multiple stakeholders.
Below are the five major gaps that in my opinion do not allow the old approach to sense
and capture the changing dynamics in which SSHPS found itself prior to the accident.
Moving from Tunnel Vision to Holistic Overviews of the Entire Socio-Technical Landscape
Complete understanding of the causes of any accident is often hindered by the ways in
which the accident is described in newspapers and official reports. This approach is a
practical way for people to comprehend, investigate, draw parallels, identify patterns,
conclude, learn lessons and prevent similar accident situations in the future.
Reliability Theory fits perfectly the logic of a chain of events. It provides facts that become
midpoints in the accident narrative that investigators reconstruct. Facts are not perceived
as "intersection points" offering an array of equally valid choices but as process points that
underline when and where incorrect decisions were made.
Hindsight gives investigators reconstructing accident narrative better and more complete
information than the actors whose decisions led to failure. Hindsight bias may, however,
exaggerate the importance of an accident's factual narrative as it minimizes less-obvious
contextual issues that contributed to accident formation.
As Nancy Leveson puts it, "viewing accidents as chains of events and conditions may limit
understanding and learning from the loss and omit causal factors that cannot be included
in an event chain" (Leveson, 2009) and "event-based models are poor at representing
systemic accidents factors such as structural deficiencies in the organization, management
deficiencies, and flaws in the safety culture of the company or industry (Leveson, 2009).
Reliability Should Not Be Confused With Safety
A system can be reliable but unsafe, as well as safe but unreliable. The conflict between
reliability and safety goes even deeper (Leveson, 2009). On one hand, if the system is
reliable it can be safe overall, while deterioration in reliability may lead to a decrease in
safety. On the other hand, there could be situations in which an increase in reliability may
lead to a decrease in safety and vice versa. In other words, the relationship between
reliability and safety is not linear; it can be as diverse as the emergent relations of a
system's subcomponents. In the case of the SSHSP accident only 10 out of 75 casualties at
the station were involved in the station's core operational activities. The other 65 were
workers employed by a subsidiary company (Council of Federation, 2009a) in charge of
station maintenance. These people could have been evacuated from the station as the
situation emerged. In other words, had proper remedial action been taken, unreliable
equipment need not have led to a dangerous situation for the majority of the station's
workers.
In Eurasia, political agendas have historically played an important role in decision-making.
It was often the case that achieving policy goals (political goals, economic development,
budget constraints, push for technological modernization, greater public utility) was a
greater priority than the safety of citizens and consumers. With the evolution of market
reforms, this trend has received new impulse as financial insurance tools are used to
mitigate technological risks. In either case, "reliability is often quantified as a mean time
between failure" (Leveson, 2009) in terms of political, engineering or financial loss.
In the majority of situations decision-makers and experts recognize difference between
(1) reliability for political and/or financial gains, and (2) safety of people in and around
particular systems. It is the public that may confuse and interchange these two concepts.
The trade-off between reliability and safety are very often conscious choices of decision
makers rather than confusion of terms.
The irreconcilable dilemma faced by the reliability approach and its probabilistic
assessment is that it neither integrates new and often immeasurable factors into its
framework nor ignores such factors when they are irrelevant.
Role of Operators in Accidents and The Culture of Blame
In the aftermath of an accident, one can easily list logical arguments about how and why
people should have foreseen and prevented upcoming events. We easily judge people who
failed to take proper action. We focus on such personal shortcomings as absence of proper
training and experience, health conditions, hours of proper sleep, etc. We tend to focus our
attention on people who happened to be closest to the accident in terms of time and space.
Human error is often associated with the role of human operators who are supposed to
activate, deactivate, control, intervene and prevent an emergency situation. As systems
become more complex so do the roles of operators. All characteristics prone to complex
systems - hierarchy, segmentation, expansion of borders, etc. - are applicable to the
changing role of operators. In other words, complex systems are managed on different
levels, from different locations and often by operators with different control and
prevention tools, mental models, organizational cultures and economic priorities.
In the case of the SSHPS accident, there were at least three major operational points: the
Siberian Dispatch Center, the Central Operation Room of the Bratsk Hydro Power Plant and
the Central Operation Room of the SSHPS. Each had different priorities prior to and during
the accident, each had limited abilities to intervene and prevent the accident, each had
incomplete and insufficient information about the emerging accident.
More importantly, each of the three operating rooms was no more than the end-point of a
linear chain of events. Reverse-engineering the accident based on such end-points may
provide a limited and distorted picture, leading to an incomplete and flawed conclusion.
Reliability Theory stresses the internal components of each of the subsystems and
questions why the system was unable to operate when some of its components failed.
System Theory attempts to recreate the environment in which these decisions were made.
"Without changing the environment, human error cannot be reduced for long. We design
systems in which operator error is inevitable and then blame the operator and not the
system design" (Leveson, 2009).
Role of Software in Accidents
The role played by software brings us back to the discussion of co-existence of old and new
technologies. Software today presents engineers with significant shortcuts that allow them
to "write down the design of instructions to accomplish the desired goal" (Leveson, 2009).
The introduction and adaptation of new mechanical and software components
(subsystems) into existing systems raise issues that the Reliability approach is unable to
address.
For example: a new Power Management and Process Control System (PMPCS) was
introduced into SSH PS's design during the station's 28th year of operation. The logical
design of the software and the electro-mechanical design of the power plant were
conducted years apart, in vastly different technological environments. The algorithms of
PMPCS and SSHPS's oldest turbine were not properly implemented. The original designers
could not have anticipated the new power management system characteristics. Thus the
software modernization of the SSHPS should have taken into account changes to the system
over time and synchronized implementation of the new software with the original
subsystems of SSH PS.
The initially coupled roles of SSHPS-(1) electricity generation and (2) stability of the
Siberian Regional Energy Grid System amid any disruption-were not clearly separated
between state and private interests. Designers of the power management software
introduced to manage SSHPS did not recognize the separation of such roles.
Static Versus Dynamic View of the System
The Reliability Theory's definition of system borders focuses attention on internal and
measurable components of the system. The reliability approach helps to construct a static
and clearly defined system. External and/or immeasurable factors are ignored and
considered irrelevant.
The evolution of the Siberian Regional Energy Grid System, and the sporadic and
fragmented introduction of power management software at the SSHPS, have over time
changed the operating environment. Operators at the station, and at the Siberia Regional
Dispatch Center, have an efficient and effective - but incomplete - picture of the process as
well as limited abilities to manage the process. The growing complexity of relations
between operator and machines, between operators, and between machines may lead to
new types of accidents. A new operational environment may lead to unanticipated new
types of human errors
All this suggests that systems exist in a highly dynamic environment. As Rasmussen says,
"accidents are often caused not by a coincidence of independent failures but instead reflect
a systematic migration of organizational behavior to the boundaries of safe behavior under
pressure towards cost-effectiveness in an aggressive, competitive environment"
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000).
In sum, this catalogue of factors requires that we revisit problems of critical infrastructure
in general and the SSHPS accident in particular. The system safety approach offers different
perspective on dealing with complexity, looking at complex systems in terms of
hierarchical levels in which "each level imposing constraints on the degree of freedom of
the components at the lower level" (Leveson, 2009) as opposed to focusing on primary
predetermined functions and the survivability of critical components.
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Chapter 3. System Boundaries and Chain of Events
"Many good ideas are really two ideas in one - which form a
bridge between two realms of thought or different points of view"
(Marvin Minsky).
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce readers to the SSHPS as a system, describe key
events that took prior and during the accident and take an initial step in comprehending
the accident's complexity.
As I mentioned before, event-based reconstruction of an accident creates a tunnel vision in
which many critical factors and developments are omitted as irrelevant and insignificant.
Defining the chain of events is just a first step in understanding proximate processes. This
is important-but insufficient-in understanding an accident.
The danger here is that we often are satisfied with such incomplete pictures. We rush to
conclusions. We search for pre-existing mental models of historical accidents. On the
contrary, the nature of complex system tells us that potential accidents may be unique in
nature. A broader analysis of the accident will give us an understanding of the system
theory approach that we can use in forward-looking mode.
I will briefly stop to give the reader key facts about SSHPS's System Legacy. I will then
spend substantial time describing the evolution of the system's boundaries over time.
Finally, readers will be presented with a description of proximate events at SSHPS prior to
and during the accident.
3.1 System Legacy
Prior Floods and the Spillway
Both the Official Investigation Report by Rostekhnadzor and the Report of the
Parliamentary Commission state that no external physical processes had significant affect
on the event before or during the accident. However, it is worth mentioning that three
previous accidents were related to seasonal high water and spring flooding.
Major flooding accidents took place in 1979, 1985 and 1988. On May 23, 1979, while the
station was under construction, record-high water led to the emergency discharge of water
through the unfinished waste weir, which led to flooding of the only operating turbine. It
took 112 days to re-start the generator.
In 1985 and 1988 major floods tested the station, which led to partial destruction and flow
up overall of the hydraulic jump basin. All three accidents showed the need for the
alternative shore spillway that was initially designed as part of the SSHPS complex (Council
of Federation, 2009a). However, due to financial difficulties, construction of the alternative
spillway was delayed until 2005. It was incomplete at the time of the 2009 accident;
information about its readiness as of that time is unavailable.
The presence of the alternative spillway could have given immediate and long-term
advantage to SSHPS during the most recent accident. An emergency discharge through an
alternative shore spillway could have helped to localize the accident in a shorter period of
time.
In the aftermath of the accident, presence of the discharge spillway could have eased
pressure on the hydraulic jump basin, which had to operate in emergency-discharge mode
for more than a year. Such conditions led to heavy ice build-up on the dam during Siberian
winter and a gradual change in the subsoil of the dam's foundation during spring and
summer, compromising the hydraulic basin's structural integrity. The three combined
factors created a long-term safety threat jeopardizing populations living downstream from
the station.
The alternative shore spillway was completed in record time in early September 2010,
which gave much-needed relief to the hydraulic jump basin and to the station's three
operational turbines (Goncharenko, 2010).
Experimental Design of Turbine 2
The station's design was in many respects experimental. It experienced a number of
contingency situations and received follow-up services from its project designers up until
the mid-1990s. In particular, its oldest turbine, Turbine 2, was experimental in nature, with
only two safe regimes of operation. It had two safe zones that were recommended for
operation. These were Load Zone 1: from 0 to 265 Megawatt and Load Zone 3: from 570 to
640 Megawatt. There was also unsafe Load Zone 2 between from 265 to 570 Megawatts
(Council of Federation, 2009a). The turbine's designers recommended passing through the
unsafe zone as quickly as possible. However, the headwater, which determines the speed of
water, as well as absence of the spillway, also played roles in how quickly the turbine could
pass through unsafe mode.
The turbine limitations were known, as was information about equipment maturity and
overhaul cycles. Prior to official acceptance of the station's full operation in 2000 the
research institute that provided post-acceptance service was not involved in maintenance
or modernization of the turbine. On March 12, 2009 (6 months prior to the accident)
Turbine 2 underwent capital repair. The station's Chief Engineer took pride in the fact that
this repair entailed introduction of a management system for individual servomotors,
which provided individual hydraulic actuators for each turbine blade. This was the first
time this technology had been employed (RusHydro, March 23, 2009).
Other design flaws
In terms of safety constraints, hydro electricity generation is considered a mature
technology whose behavior is fully studied and understood. However, after the accident,
the Official Investigation Report by FSETAI and the Report of the Parliamentary
Commission came to the conclusion that the station's design had several flaws.
The station's design did not include a guaranteed (alternative) power source for the
emergency closing valve. The system for automatic return of the emergency closing valve
did not react because its design had not included such an emergency scenario. The turbine
room did not separate turbines into silos (something not generally practiced in the design
of hydro power stations).
3.2 System Boundaries and Evolution of the System Over Time
Drawing boundaries of the system is a very difficult task, especially for such a complex
system. There can be different interpretations of where boundaries should be drawn. First
and foremost, however, we need to recognize that SSHPS is just a subsystem of a higher-
level system and its processes. It should be thus considered within a larger context.
More importantly, SSHPS was initially a subsystem of a single higher-level system.
However, liberalization of the electricity market, followed by separation of power
generation and transmission, led to a situation in which SSHPS became a subsystem of two
different higher-level systems-(1) RusHydro holding and (2) Siberian Regional Energy
Grid System-each with separate goals and operational priorities.
Siberian Regional Energy Grid System
Figure 4: System Boundary Prior to 2000
There are several definitions of what constitutes a system. System boundaries are context-
dependent, and they shift depending on context analysis.
If we consider a system as more than the sum of its components, then SSHPS fits into the
Siberian Regional Energy Grid System; its goal as such is to maintain the stability of the
energy grid system, achieved by an increase or decrease in power generation.
If we consider that a system is a set of directly and indirectly interconnected "components
that act together as a whole to achieve some common goal, objective, or end" (Leveson,
2009), SSHPS becomes a subsystem of Russia's State controlled energy holding RusHydro,
with the goal of generating low-cost electricity for industrial production, particularly the
production of aluminum.
At the time of its original design, when SSHPS was expected to be part of a single super-
system, these two goals had to be coordinated. Immediate priority was given to the
system's stability, while long-term priority was focused on the power generation. As
generation and transmission functions were separated into two different systems, these
two goals were divorced, each coming under the purview of a different system.
Figure 5: System Boundaries After 2000
System 1: Siberian Regional Energy Grid Operator. Subsystem 1.1: SSHPS.
System 2: RusHydro. Subsystem 2.1: SSHPS.
System 3: IrkutskEnergo. Subsystem: 3.1 Bratsk HPS, Subsystem 3.2: Ust Ilimsk
HPS.
Only these three HPSs -SSHPS, Ust Ilimsk HPS and Bratsk HPS-are hydropower stations
used to stabilize the Siberian Regional Energy Grid System (Rostekhnadzor, 2009). Bratsk
and Ust Ilimsk hydropower stations are part of the Angara hydro cascade located
approximately 1500 km northeast of SSHPS. These stations are part of Irkutsk Power
Generation and Distribution Company IrkutskEnergo (IrkutskEnergo, 2007); 50,19 %
belongs to En+ Group (Ispolatov, 2010) controlled by Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, who
also a CEO of Russia's Aluminum producing conglomerate RUSAL. 40% of the stakes are
still in the hands of the Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimuschestvo).
Generation Domain
The chart below describes the generation domain in detail. According to The Law on
Electricity Energy, the government intervenes in the Electricity Sector in order to ensure
the unity of system process control and management; safeguard the balance of interests
between producers and consumers of electricity; manage state property in the electricity
industry; introduce and regulate tariffs for specific services, etc. (Russian Federation,
2003).
In the power generation domain, the goals of SSHPS include generation of low-cost energy,
overall safety and reliability of the station, the safety of station personnel, and the safety of
50,000 people living downstream from the station.
Prior to the 2009 accident, the main hazard at the station was high water during flood
season and the aging dam's structural integrity. Both required constant monitoring, and
both were considered exogenous factors (weather, time, season, temperature, etc.). Most
significant among such exogenous factors are 1) water level of the upper reservoir that
determined the headwater, and 2) significant temperature fluctuation that affected the
water levels.
The life-cycle of the existing electricity generation infrastructure was another prime source
of the problem. Complex measurements of infrastructure deterioration were not practiced.
Infrastructure deterioration factors did not affect financial planning, maintenance or
technical safety behaviors. In other words, in the case of this particular accident, not only
had operator behavior become unsafe, but also there are symptoms that the system itself
had gradually started to migrate to an unsafe domain.
Representatives of the Federal Service for Environmental, Technical and Atomic Inspection
(FSETAI) did not inspect hydro-turbine units because they were not categorized as
hazardous industrial facilities. Newly adopted law on Technical Regulations had not yet
established a regulatory framework for follow-up. Some existing technical regulations were
reclassified from "required" to "recommended" mode.
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Figure 6: SSHPS in Power Generation Domain
Operation Dispatch Management Domain
The goal of SSHPS in the Operation Dispatch Management Domain was to remain a reliable
source for voltage and frequency of the Siberian Electric System and to actively participate
in stabilization when necessary.
The technological foundations of Russia's Electricity sector are a unified national electrical
network, territorial distribution networks and a unified system of operation dispatch. The
Law on Electric Power Sector serves to ensure a reliable power supply and power quality
that meets the requirements of technical regulations (Russian Federation, 2003).
The Siberian Regional Energy Grid System is not directly integrated with the European part
of the United Energy System, relying instead on Kazakhstan's infrastructure, which
connects the European and Siberian energy systems. During the accident, significant
amount of power had to be transferred from Kazakhstan to keep the Siberian system stable
until thermal power plants were able to increase production.
System hazards on the level of the Siberian Regional Energy Grid System are possible grid
blackouts, which, in the context of the harsh Siberian climate and the region's energy-
intensive heavy industry, can have significant economic effects. As a result, the Siberian
Unified Grid Combined System Dispatch focused its attention on electricity grid stability,
reliability and synchrony.
As one expert points out, in the majority of Russia's regional electricity networks it is
acceptable practice to compensate for the recovery of reactive power by means of
electricity generation. Such a systemic characteristic of using brute force of fluctuating
power generation leads to "decrease of functionality capabilities and deterioration in
operation modes of power stations' generators, as well as overall decrease of reliability of
the energy system" (Council of Federation, 2009b).
In addition to the legacy hazard, fragmented introduction of new methods and instruments
of power management systems (active and reactive power management instruments) led
to further complexity and confusion.
Further deregulation of the electricity market in 2011 will require the generation,
transmission and distribution components of a previously integrated infrastructure to be
more flexible and responsive to fluctuation in the demand and supply of electricity.
"Temporal flexibility" becomes the new system's requirement, which was not considered in
its original design. Such a requirement will add more uncertainty to an already fragmented
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3.3 Proximate Events at SSHPS
This section describes proximate events occurred prior and during the accident. The
description is based on the report of the official investigation conducted by FSETAI
(Rostekhnadzor, 2009) and the official parliamentary report (Council of Federation,
2009a). The time of events mentioned is local; the date format is dd.mm.year.
19:14, 16.08.2009 - On the order of the Siberian Dispatch Center, Turbine 2 at the SSHPS
was turned on from reserve mode.
20:20, 16.08.2009 - Fire broke out at Bratsk HPS the night prior to the accident. The Central
Control Room of the Bratsk HPS reported shutdown of the automatic frequency control
system, automated system, and voice communication with the regional transmission
company and its local control dispatch. Two main fiber-optic cables that provided Bratsk
HPS's communication went down. Equipment for the main and reserve communication
channels was off. The automatic frequency control system and voice communication with
the Siberian Unified Grid Combined System Dispatch (SUGCSD or Siberian Dispatch Center)
was down.
20:31,16.08.2009 - After the loss of communication with Bratsk HPS the dispatcher at the
Siberian Dispatch Center orders operators at the SSHPS to switch Control group of active
and reactive power (GRARM) to automated mode from the Central automatic frequency
control system at the Siberian Dispatch Center. Between 20:31, 16.08.2009 and 4:12,
17.08.2009 SSHPS was managed in distant mode by the SUGSD from city of Kemerovo,
approximately 800 km northwest of SSHPS and 2500 km west of Bratsk HPS.
20:50, 16.08.2009 - The fire at the Bratsk HPS was localized. At 21:00 Operator at Bratsk
HPS was able to reach the dispatcher at the SUGSD by regular cell phone. For 40 minutes
the Bratsk HPS was unmonitored by the Siberian Dispatch Center. At 10:03, 17.08.2009
emergency mode was switched off and communication was reestablished.
4:00, 17.08.2009 - Crew shift took place at the SSHPS (local time 8:00). Nine of the ten
turbines were in operation (including Turbine 2). Turbine 6 was in reserve. Total active
power of the operating turbines - 4400 megawatt, the level of headwater elevation -
537.11 meters.
Figure 8: Siberian Regional Energy Grid System (Sagers, et al., 2009)
Prior to the accident the vibration amplitude of the Turbine 2 cover bearing increased 4
times. After yet another capacity decrease, the locking pins of Turbine 2 cover fractured,
leading to increased fluctuation of the rotor. As a result, the whole hydraulic component
was moving up in the shaft. The power plant was flooded through the empty shaft of
Turbine 2.
As the rotor passed a certain level on the shaft it switched to pumping mode, which created
excessive pressure on the blades of the turbine. Turbine 2's still working cross head and
rotor destroyed Turbine Room and turbines 2, 3 and 4.
40
4:13, 17.08.2009 - Working personnel of the Turbine room heard a loud slap in the vicinity
of Turbine 2, followed by surge of head of water. In the Central Control Room sound-and-
light alert was turned on.
Operational communication, operational electricity, automated systems, signaling/warning
systems, and system for indicator and monitoring were shut down. Operators of the Central
Control Room visually (via window) saw a flow of water (about one meter high) from the
Turbine Room. Several passages of the Turbine Room were destroyed. Active load shedding
to 0 megawatt, including internal needs. The Turbine room was destroyed by Turbine 2,
subsequent power outage and lost to the flood.
5:00, 17.08.2009 - Emergency services were notified about limited flooding of the Turbine
Room. The first emergency group arriving on the scene was not prepared for the
magnitude of the accident.
5:20, 17.08.2009 - At the top of the dam technological valves of each turbine were closed
manually and the flow of water was stopped. The Turbine Room remains flooded at the tail
water level of the dam. Drainage of the Turbine Room was not possible due to
dysfunctional valves behind the turbines.
7:32, 17.08.2009 - External power was supplied to frame crane at the top of the dam.
7:50, 17.08.2009 - The emergency crew opened valves of the spillway dike manually.
9:07, 17.08.2009 - The balance of the incoming and outgoing water was restored. The level
of headwater elevation - 537.16 meters. Mainskaya HPS downstream completed
contingency water discharge. After initial visual assessment, turbines 2, 7 and 9 were
destroyed. Turbines 1 and 3 were significantly damaged.
11:04, 17.08.2009 - Siberian Energy Systems was stabilized.
13:07, 17.08.2009 - Accident was localized.
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Chapter 4. Identifying Conditions Using STAMP Analysis
"Complexity usually arisesfrom a small number of disproportionally
complex procedures" (Henry, Kafura, 1984).
"A program is a human artifact, a real-life program is a complex human
artifact; and any human artifact of sufficient size and complexity is
imperfect" (De Millo, Lipton, Perlis, 1979).
The purpose of this chapter is to employ the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and
Process (STAMP) to analyze the SSHPS accident. Hierarchy theory was discussed in the
previous chapter. STAMP presents an accident from multiple analytical positions. STAMP
allows us to be flexible, to set multiple viewing points in terms of time, hierarchical levels
and proximity to the event.
The STAMP model's clear, simple steps were developed by Professor Nancy Leveson
(2009). They are:
1. Safety requirements and constraints
2. Controls
3. Context
4. Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions
5. Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
4.1 First Level Operations: Operations Service/Turbine room
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
Operation service is located in closest proximity to the turbines. Accurate information
generated by monitoring equipment allows operators to maintain awareness of the overall
process. Physical presence of personnel in the turbine rooms is partially due to the legacy
of existing systems, as well as the fact that monitoring equipment used at the station was
insufficient and/or unreliable to operate without constant human presence.
Inadequate Control Actions:
Operators do not have significant control functions; they have to maintain monitoring
equipment-especially operators responsible for the electricity quality, i.e. its frequency
and voltage.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
a. Roles and responsibilities
Being in closest proximity to turbines, operators also have to maintain discipline in the
operation-dispatch process and immediately inform the direct line of management about
emergency situations.
Operators' major responsibilities include adherence of the operational mode of the
turbines, monitoring parameters of operational equipment, and monitoring operations that
involve the start and shutdown of turbines.
b. Environmental and behavior-shaping factors
On the day of the accident, the operators were in contingency mode as the command to
start Turbine 2 came down. Operators knew about the limitations of Turbine 2, and the fact
that it was the oldest turbine at the station and had undergone overhaul earlier that year.
The head of the unit (49 years old) had more than 8 years of experience in the position.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
The degree to which personnel were aware of the emergency situation on the regional grid
level remains unclear. During the 4 hours prior to the accident Turbine 2 was managed
remotely from the Siberian Dispatch Center. After the accident it was clear that commands
sent from the Siberian Dispatch Center through the automated system had distributed the
load unevenly to turbines 2, 7 and 9. It is not clear when information about the increase in
the vibration of Turbine 2 was passed on to the Central operation room and further to the
Siberian Dispatch Center. The load on the turbine increased and decreased several times
within few hours. It seems the accident took place as the Operation Service was trying to
slow down Turbine 2 manually.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
It is clear that there was inadequate communication between Operations, The Central
Control Room and the Siberian Dispatch Center.
As Turbine 2 was taken over by the Siberian Dispatch Center, personnel could have
reported data about the turbine's anomalous behavior to the Central Room of the SSHPS,
but it is unclear if this information was relayed to the Siberian Dispatch Center. There was
no direct communication or feedback channel that allowed Turbine Room personnel to
communicate with the dispatch center in case of emergency.
4.2 Second-Level Operations: SSHPS's Service Units
Production and Technical Service
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
The head of the Production and Technical Service is responsible for maintaining
continuous and reliable operation of the turbines.
According to the Official Accident Report (Rostekhnadzor, 2009), these responsibilities also
included informing the direct line of report about emergency situations and the
interruption of the operation in case of emergency according to standard operational
procedures.
Inadequate Control Actions:
The turbines (hydro-aggregates) of the SSHPS had three layers of "defense"
(Rostekhnadzor, 2009):
e Main protection: includes 15 different functions, a majority of them focused on the
operation and reliability of the main generator.
* Reserve protection: includes 7 functions primarily focused on protecting the rotor
of the turbine from overload.
e Hydro-mechanical protection: includes 9 functions that could be activated in case
the turbine had to be turned off.
None of the 31 functions were directly related to increases of vibration in the turbine. Only
one main function was indirectly related to vibration; it addressed asynchrony of the
generator.
According to the official investigation report, the head of the Production and Technical
Service did not provide personnel with qualitative operational instructions and timely
reconsideration of these instructions. The head of the Production and Technical Service
also failed to conduct proper analysis and assessment of equipment conditions
(Rostekhnadzor, 2009).
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
Turbine 2 had a complete overhaul in 2005 and an intermediate overhaul in 2009 (finished
on March 16, 2009) with installation of individual hydraulic actuators for each turbine
blade (Rostekhnadzor, 2009). According to the accident report, the head of the service may
not have had complete information about Turbine 2's history and problems. The head of
the service (51 years old) had only 2 months of experience in that position.
a. Roles and responsibilities
As the accident developed the head of the service had sufficient vibration data that was
coming of from the turbine. However, it seems that the Head of Production and Technical
Service may not have had enough time to communicate the findings or did not have enough
time to react.
b. Environmental and behavior-shaping factors
The turbine's control mechanisms were imbedded in its cover, which cut loose as vibration
peaked. It is possible that at some point it was not possible to stop the turbine manually as
it went out of control.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
There was a time lag between two events: (1) when the turbine was switched from reserve
to operational mode by the SSHPS's Central Room and (2) when the Siberian Dispatch
Center assumed remote mode operation of the turbine. It is not clear when the Head of the
Production and Technical Service became aware of the second event.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
Inadequate coordination or communication, as well as incomplete awareness of the
emerging situation, may have been the reasons for flaws. The Head of Production and
Technical Service knew about Turbine 2's limitations, but operated in contingency mode
and may not have known about the intent of the regional dispatch center. In other words,
he did not have a full picture of the emerging situation that had been taking place within
the Siberian Regional Energy Grid System.
Equipment Monitoring Services
Safety Requirements and Constrains:
Most of the monitoring systems built into the SSHPS were based on analog technology and
dispersed along huge monitoring dashboards. Lower-hierarchy subsystems have sensors
only in their close proximity. Such dispersion of sensors and fragmentation of information
did not allow the monitoring service to aggregate information in a timely and adequate
manner.
The responsibilities of the Head of Equipment Monitoring Services included the following
functions: guaranteeing operation of the sensor equipment and system; maintaining
operational readiness; detecting and preventing anomalies in the system.
Inadequate Control Actions:
Turbine 2's vibration control monitors were not put into operation; vibration data was thus
not considered by either station management or service personnel (Rostekhnadzor, 2009).
It is not clear if the Head of Equipment Monitoring Services received, processed and
analyzed the results of any indirect vibration data that was coming from the turbines on
time. Due to contingency mode, dispersion of sensors and diversity of data, he could not
make an objective decision.
Even if he realized that sensors were showing anomalous behavior, he could not intervene
to make decisions and actions with regard to turbine operation. There is also a possibility
he did not have enough time to communicate the findings or did not have enough time to
react.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
a. Roles and responsibilities
The head of the unit (42 years old) had only 2 months of experience at that position. It is
most likely that as head of the service he had little sufficient experience or no training for
such emergency situations.
b. Environmental and behavior-shaping factors
According to the Official Investigation Report (Rostekhnadzor), Turbine 2 operated outside
the accepted limits 210 times, with a total of 2520 seconds, since the last most recent
maintenance that took place six months prior to the accident. Dangerous capacity
fluctuation seemed to have been acceptable behavior.
On the day of the accident Turbine 2 changed its planned and emergent capacity 12 times.
Between 23:14 of 16.08.2009 and 8:13 of 17.08.2009 such fluctuation resulted in six
occasions when Turbine 2 operated outside recommended limits (Council of Federation,
2009a). It seems that on that day unacceptable capacity fluctuations were part of the
contingency routine.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
The Chief SSHPS Engineer was called in at 6:35 am on 17.08.2009, i.e. 98 minutes before
the accident (Council of Federation, 2009a). This means that people at Equipment
Monitoring Services would have had a chance to inform management about Turbine 2's
anomalous behavior at least two hours before the accident had vibration data existed.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
Head of Equipment Monitoring Services possibly understood that the problem was
emerging, but could not imagine the gravity of the situation and had inadequate control
mechanisms with which to respond.
Reliability and Technical Safety Service
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
The Head of Reliability and Technical Safety Service was responsible for both the safety of
people at working at the station and the reliability and safety of equipment. However, the
direct safety of personnel is not defined as a priority in his list of responsibilities.
Safety instructions for power stations and electricity grids are defined by decree of Russia's
Ministry of Energy (2003). The list of responsibilities includes: maintaining operational-
dispatch discipline; maintaining equipment in a state of operational readiness; providing
efficient and reliable production of electricity; implementing industrial safety rules;
providing uniform measurements during production; the transmission and distribution of
energy.
Inadequate Control Actions:
Most workers who died at the station were not part of the station's core operational
personnel. They were maintenance staff performing maintenance functions on the station's
lower decks. The majority of casualties were employees of maintenance subcontractors. At
the time of the accident there were about 300 people present at the station
(Rostekhnadzor, 2009). The morning shift started its working day at the station at 8:00 am,
just 13 minutes before the accident. Reliability and Technical Safety Service did not take
any action that could have prevented people from starting their working shift.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
a. Roles and responsibilities
It is not clear who was responsible for the safety of station and subcontractor employees at
the station.
The Head of Reliability and Technical Safety Service had more than 6 years and 8 months'
experience in this position.
b. Environmental and behavior-shaping factors
A contingency situation initially emerged beyond the station's physical border, thus outside
the area of responsibility of Head of Reliability and Technical Safety Service. As the
situation emerged, personnel focused on the grid's emergency level. Attention and priority
was given to stabilization of the regional grid system. Unacceptable capacity fluctuation of
the turbine had happened before; these events were not considered extraordinary.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
There was no clear delineation of responsibility for human safety by either The Reliability
and Technical Safety Service or The Economic Security and Regime Service. The head of
Reliability and Technical Safety Service was primarily concerned with the reliability of
equipment. The head of the Economic Security and Regime Service, another unit created as
part of the reforms at the station, was supposed to be responsible for emergency situations
and the evacuation of people. He was not aware of the situation emerging at the station,
however, and was outside the flow of information.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
Attention was focused on the emergency at the regional grid level. It did not occur to the
heads of the Reliability and Technical Safety Service and the Economic Security and Regime
Service, or to the station's Chief Engineer, to halt the working day until the situation
became clear.
It is possible that the Head of Reliability and Technical Safety Service had not considered
coupling problems between software and hardware or the possibility that such coupling
would lead to devastating results.
Technological Systems Management Service
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
The Head of Technological System Management Service is responsible for Power
Management and Process Control System of the station. His responsibility includes the
following functions: guaranteeing synchrony and unity measurements of between
generation; transmission and distribution of electricity; maintaining operational readiness;
servicing and maintaining sensor systems; understanding behavior of the Power
Management and Process Control System; testing the system extensively during the testing
and acceptance period.
Inadequate Control Actions:
a. Roles and responsibilities
It is unclear whether the Head of Technological System Management Service failed to
properly record the anomalous incidents of system prior to the accident. It is also unclear
whether this information was reported to management. After the accident, the Official
Investigation Report found that in the total hours of operation since the last maintenance in
March 2009, Turbine 2 operated outside the accepted limits 210 times, for a total of 2520
seconds (Council of Federation, 2009a).
b. Environmental and behavior-shaping factors
It is not clear whether the Head of Technological System Management Service was present,
in any capacity, during the acceptance process of Turbine 2. Nor is it clear whether he was
present for the testing and certification of the upgraded Power Management and Process
Control System (GRARM) between March-July 2009.
The algorithm of the Upgraded Power Management and Process Control System was not
synchronized properly with the turbines. The software developer did not consult the
turbine manufacturer with regard to the turbine's specifications or its unique or faulty
characteristics (Council of Federation, 2009b).
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
The Head of Technological System Management Service (53 years old) had only 3 months
of experience in that position. It is not clear whether he was fully familiar with the legacy of
Turbine 2.
Turbine 2 was one of the earliest turbines commissioned for operational service. It began
operating with a temporary runner on November 5, 1979 and a regular runner on
November 7, 1986 (Rostekhnadzor, 2009). The turbine was experimental in nature and
had only two safe regimes of operation. It had two safe zones that were recommended for
operation. These were Load Zone 1: from 0 to 265Megawatt and Load Zone 3: from 570 to
640 Megawatt. There was also unsafe Load Zone 2 between from 265 to 570 megawatts
(Council of Federation, 2009a).
The Turbine manufacturer was present at the station and provided technical support until
the late 1990s. The manufacturer recommended that, while switching from one mode to
another, the unsafe load zone should be passed very quickly to avoid increases in vibration.
Adherence to these recommendations would preclude Turbine 2's inclusion in the Power
Management and Process Control System (Council of Federation, 2009b).
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
As the Siberian regional grid level emergency became clear, the Head of the Technological
System Management Service assumed the Power Management and Process Control System
would regulate the active power load among operating turbines, while the distribution of
reactive power would maintain maximum robustness. The mental model that the software
system would balance emerging anomalies proved to be faulty.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
The Head of the Technological System Management Service possibly understood the
gravity of the emerging situation, but could not interfere in the process since his functions
were secondary to the Operations. He assumed that Operation Service and the Siberian
Dispatch Service had the same amount of information.
4.3 Third level of operations: Power Management and Process Control
System
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
In 2005 the Sankt-Petersburg-based company called Rakus began the large-scale
modernization of the automated process control systems (APCS) Sayano-Shushenskaya
and Mainsk HPS with Siemens Solution Partner Automation.
A key element of the Power Management and Process Control System is the Group
Regulator for Active and Reactive Powers (GRARM), which was developed by its
subcontractor Promavtomatika. GRARM function was configuration and distribution of the
planned and unplanned loads that come through the Automatic system for regulating
frequency and power from the Siberian Unified Grid System Dispatch. The system is
supposed to calculate the load of new order that comes from the dispatch center and
distribute this load between individual regulator units at each of the station's turbines.
Inadequate Control Actions:
According to the Parliamentary report there were mishaps and diversions during different
stages of software development. The requirements of the new software system were not
consented to and approved by Lenhydroproject, the station's general designer.
During the developmental stage the system's design, structure and specifications were
subject to many iterative changes. The Parliamentary report stresses that the Power
Management and Process Control System specifications included only control and
visualization of the turbine's vane position. The specifications did not include scenarios in
which the turbine's vanes are desynchronized. Another omission pointed out by the report
was the absence of reserve/alternative sources of power supply for the Power
Management and Process Control System (Council of Federation, 2009a).
With regard to GRARM, the Parliamentary report indicates that system requirements were
developed by station personnel, and did not include (1) criteria for developing functional
priorities for turbines operating under GRARM, (2) individual load limits and unsafe mode
regimes for each turbine, (3) the individual characteristics and structure of each turbine.
Moreover, there were no criteria for selecting priority turbines and no time limits for such
priority to remain active. The impact algorithm on GRARM that served as an interface with
the automatic frequency control system was not consistent with the turbine
manufacturer's requirements.
As mentioned before, one of the new and unique improvements of the overhauled Turbine
2 was introduction of management systems for individual servomotors. This allowed for
individual hydraulic actuators for each turbine blade, which was a technology that had not
been used before (RusHydro, March 23, 2009).
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
In 1998 the original Soviet-made automated system was discharged as "morally obsolete"
due to increased number of failure occurrences and absence of the service suppliers
(Rostekhnadzor, 2009). Decommission of the original software led to fragmentation of the
command and control systems, in particular synchronized water discharged functions for
both SSHPS and the Mainsk HPS, located downstream, which now had to be managed
separately.
The new GRARM was accepted into testing mode in 2006 and, after six months, into
operational mode. 2006 was the last year when developers from Promavtomatika visited
the station. Later that year individual regulators, with whom GRARM was connected, were
replaced by the SSHPS personnel without the technical assistance of its subcontractor.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
Initially the GRARM was developed as a monitoring and visualization program and did not
include safety functions in the case of anomalous behavior of the station's turbines.
GRARM had no safety functions. The system was not obligatory, and SSHPS could have
operated with GRARM turned off. In fact, when the operator at the Siberian Unified Grid
System Dispatch required GRARM to be turned off, he would give shutdown commands to
the SSHPS operators.
It is important to stress that station personnel had reported several incidents with GRARM.
Such incidents included unsanctioned by the regional dispatch access to the system and
drops in power load (Council of Federation, 2009a). There were some attempts made to
add safety features to protect the system from unauthorized access. However, such
attempts were unsystematic, fragmentary and did not address GRARM's core technical
specifications.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
The Parliamentary report states that the original design of the Power Management and
Process Control System had a safety function that would give shutdown command to
turbines. There was also an option to imbed a preventive alarm system. However, after
testing the system, it was kept in a purely informative mode. We can assume the reason the
alarm system was turned off was that it would have shut down the turbine every time it
passed through the unsafe load zone (from 265 to 570 Megawatt) (Council of Federation,
2009a).
In addition, there was no vibration data input into the GRARM system. Since the system had
no criteria for turbine prioritization, vibration data would not have made any difference.
However, if the system had been structured to include a prioritization algorithm, a
vibration input and a preventive alarm system, operators would have had a better
understanding of the emerging situation.
The fact that the system allowed simultaneous operation of turbines under GRARM and in a
manual mode led to additional complexity for SSHPS operators. At the moment of the
accident, 6 turbines were under GRARM and 3 were operated manually.
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4.4 Fourth Level of Operations: Management of the Station
Deputy Chief Engineer for Operation
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
The Deputy Chief Engineer for Operations oversees Operations Service, Equipment
Monitoring Services (which include the electro-technical laboratory, the laboratory for
technical diagnostics and laboratory for hydro-technical structures), the Mainsk hydro
structure (located downstream from the main station), and the Technological System
Management Service.
Inadequate Control Actions:
As the key manager responsible for operations the Deputy Chief Engineer for Operations
had to aggregate information that was arriving prior the accident from the different station
units that reported to him. The key information junction was between Operation and
Monitoring Services. Fragmented information generated by these two services had to be
put together into one complete picture of the problem emerging at the station.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
The Deputy Chief Engineer for Operations was a 55 year-old engineer with 3 years and 7
months of experience in that position.
He and the heads of subordinate services seems to have given their main attention to the
situation emerging on the grid level, i.e. in the interaction between the station and Siberian
Dispatch Center level.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
Information and data generated by the monitoring service were not given proper attention.
At this level of control, the management must have had a complete picture of the emerging
situation. The Deputy Chief Engineer for Operations had authority to intervene into the
operations of his services and those of the regional dispatch center to adjust their decisions
and actions.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
It seems that, instead of making independent decisions, the Deputy Chief Engineer for
Operations chose to inform the Chief Engineer, his direct superior. The most likely
explanation for such action was the unusual nature of the emerging situation, as well as an
underestimation of the magnitude and scale of the possible accident.
Deputy Chief Engineer for Engineering
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
The Deputy Chief of Engineer for Technology is responsible for the Production and
Technical Service and the Maintenance Planning and Preparation Service.
The Deputy Chief of Engineer for Technology is responsible for evaluating station
conditions, planning overhaul arrangements and measures, and commissioning the
overhaul execution.
Inadequate Control Actions:
The actual maintenance service and its resources were separated from the station. These
services were organized into a subsidiary company that had to build its relations with
SSPHS through outsourcing contracts. Basic routine maintenance interaction within the
station was transformed into contractual relations between so-called core and non-core
actives.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
Making maintenance and overhaul non-core activities of the SSHPS was part of the
introduction of new corporate practices.
The Deputy Chief of Engineer was a 54 year-old engineer with 2 years 5 months of
experience in his position. That means he was present during the acceptance of the
intermediate overhaul of Turbine 2 and the introduction of the Power management
software program in spring 2009.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
It is not clear why station personnel - who understood the limitations of Turbine 2 - would
make it a priority turbine in the Power Management and Process Control System, which
was managed by the Siberian Regional Dispatch Center.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
Complacency, and the belief that existing technology was reliable, led to a major accident.
After the accident, the official investigation report found that in the total hours of operation
since the last maintenance (in six months of March 2009) Turbine 2 operated outside the
accepted limits 210 times, for a total of 2520 seconds (Council of Federation, 2009a). These
violations all took place under this Deputy Chief of Engineer for Technology.
Chief Engineer of the SSHPS
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
The Chief Engineer, along with two of his deputies, had a complete or holistic picture of the
emerging situation. The Chief Engineer had authority to communicate with the Regional
Dispatch center and question its decisions and commands.
The Chief Engineer is responsible for overall station safety; he directly supervises the
Reliability and Technical Safety Service.
The two deputies mentioned above report to him directly, which means that issues of
maintenance, modernization and acceptance of new or overhauled systems take place
under his direct supervision.
Two additional critical functions that had to be monitored by the Chief Engineer were (1)
development, acceptance and enforcement of functional instructions performed by his
deputies and the station's services and (2) education and training of the station's
personnel, given the fact that the majority of management had limited experience.
Inadequate Control Actions:
The Chief Engineer had limited authority with regard to the station's financial planning. In
other words budgetary resources that were at the disposal of the SSHPS management could
not have matched modernization and maintenance needs. Rather it would have required an
investment program approved by RusHydro's headquarters.
While it is not clear why Turbine 2 was put into priority mode for the regional dispatch
center, this decision was made before his arrival at the station.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
The Chief Engineer of the SSHPS was called in at 6.35 of 17.08.2009, i.e. 98 minutes before
the accident (Council of Federation, 2009a). Turbine 2 was already in operation and the
first signs of anomalous behavior were obvious. The Chief Engineer was 58 years old, with
3 years and 9 months of the experience in this particular position.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
According to the Parliamentary Report, the Chief Engineer had to stop Turbine 2 as soon as
it was clear that the turbine's vibration was reaching unacceptable levels (Council of
Federation, 2009a). Instead the turbine remained in the priority mode. It seems that the
accident took place as station personnel were trying to manually slow Turbine 2.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
It is unlikely the Chief Engineer did not have enough authority, information or time to
aggregate available information to make his decision.
However, it was not clear if the decision to shut down Turbine 2 would affect the total
generated output of the SSHPS. In other words, it is not clear if the Power Management and
Process Control System allowed stopping the turbine independently from the other 5
turbines of the station that were managed by the Siberian Unified Grid System Dispatch.
Total shutdown of the station could have affected the stability of the Siberian Regional
Energy Grid System, which eventually happened after the explosion of Turbine 2.
One of the key consumers of electricity in the Siberian Energy System is Russian Aluminum
(RUSAL), which is the world's key aluminum producer, as well as a key stakeholder in both
RusHydro (owner of SSHPS) and IrkutskEnergo (owner of Bratsk HPS). The accident at the
station affected several of RUSAL's aluminum smelters (Khakass aluminum processing
plant, 480 Mw; and Sayan aluminum processing plant, with 1040 Mw).
Director of the SSHPS
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
The Station Director understands SSHPS strategy as well as SSHPS's role and importance
within the RusHydro holding. His responsibilities include: station safety and development
of contingency scenarios for emergency situations; development, acceptance and
enforcement of functional instructions performed by his deputies and the station's
services; education and training of station personnel, given the fact that majority of
management had limited experience.
Inadequate Control Actions:
It appears likely that his budget planning, acquisition and contractual authority were
diluted by the holding's head office in Moscow. Major maintenance and overhaul projects
conducted at the station were organized by the holding's Moscow headquarters, while
station's maintenance units were removed from the station and organized into a separate
subsidiary after being reclassified as non-core activities.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
The Director delegated most responsibilities for daily operation of the station
responsibility to the Chief Engineer. The assumption of most of the director's managerial
responsibilities by company headquarters gradually led to a state of complacency.
The director was a 56 year-old engineer with 2 years and 8 months of experience at the
position. At the time of the accident he was absent from the station.
The day of the accident was the Director's birthday.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
It is not clear why the Director did not arrive at the station before or immediately after the
accident. He was not able to maintain a line of communication with regional emergency
services. It took another 40 minutes for station management to inform regional emergency
services about the accident. Emergency services were told about a moderate accident; the
first crews to arrive on the scene were thus unprepared.
The Director did not understand that the station's design did not include an alternative
power source for the emergency closing valve. The valves had to be closed manually as
Turbine 2 exploded. The station's design did not separate turbines in safe blocks as on
nuclear stations. No adequate emergency planning or training was conducted.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
It seems that the Director of SSHPS misunderstood or refused to accept the accident's
catastrophic scale. He delayed responding to the emerging situation, and delayed informing
authorities as well. He also initially reported the accident as a limited incident. It is also
likely that he underestimated the number of casualties, since the majority of the casualties
were from the station's maintenance subsidiary.
4.5 Fifth Level of Operations: Siberian Unified Grid System Dispatch
(SUGSD)
Operational-dispatch management is regulated by Russia's Federal Electricity Energy Law.
It is a set of measures for centralized management of technological modes of power-
generation facilities and power-receiving electricity consumers (Russian Federation, 2003).
The system operator is a specialized organization responsible for centralized operational
dispatch management within the domain defined by the Unified Energy System of Russia.
The system operator is responsible for issuing mandatory dispatching commands and
orders to electricity generators and electricity consumers (Russian Federation, 2003).
SUGSD is responsible for (1) ensuring the balance of power production and consumption,
(2) ensuring hierarchical principles in which level subjects of the system are subordinated
to higher-level dispatched subjects and commands, (3) unconditional execution of load-
controlled, dispatching commands and orders given by dispatching management to
electricity generators and consumers of the system, (4) implementation of measures aimed
at ensuring safe operation and preventing emergency situations, (5) taking measures
aimed at ensuring Unified Energy System of Russia's normalized reserve-generating
capacity (Russian Federation, 2003).
Inadequate Control Actions:
Power Management and Process Control System (PMPCS) at SSHPS did not include any
safety mechanisms in its specifications. Turbines cannot be started and stopped from
SUGSD; they could be started manually at the station. SUGSD had no information on the
engineering status of hardware or software at the SSHPS (Council of Federation, 2009a).
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
According to the Official investigation report, the SSHPS and SUGSD did not share or
exchange information on either the specifications of the Power Management and Process
Control System or the engineering status of the station's turbines (Rostekhnadzor, 2009).
At the time of the accident the dispatch center managed 6 turbines via the Power
Management and Process Control System and the station's operators managed 3 turbines
manually.
The situation emerged in between midnight and early morning, with the most critical
period around 7.30-7.45. There is no information when operators' working shift took place.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
The operator at SUGSD gave general commands to PMPCS, not to particular turbines. The
operator at the dispatch center had no information about increased vibration and unsafe
modes of Turbine 2. He or she had no data or reasons to respond to any anomalies in
power fluctuations by changing frequency and energy generation.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
The operator's major priority was to maintain stability in the energy system, which he or
she did. The operator was preoccupied with the emergency situation (fire and loss of
communication) at the Bratsk HPS, and dispatch commands to the SSHPS were made to
solve the problem on the level of the Regional grid to maintain system stability. The
reliability and safety of any particular turbine was not the operator's responsibility and
such responsibility was not part of the operator's mental model.
4.6 Sixth Level of Operations: RusHydro Management
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
RusHydro ranks second among the world's top 50 most rapidly developing energy
companies, just behind Ultrapar Participacoes SA, Brazil. (RusHydro, November 3, 2010)
According to its strategy, the company anticipates industry consolidation trends, in which
"the shortage of public financial resources necessitates a large-scale investment program to
be implemented by industry entities, creating prerequisites for a consolidated management
system" (RusHydro, June 16, 2010).
In terms of safety requirements and constraints, its management aims to: maintain
information about the economic and physical security of RusHydro; develop uniform
technological policy in regard to automatic process control systems, automated power
management and communication systems; achieve control over implementation of
production program and engineering policy of its subsidiaries; develop comprehensive
plans for R&D, maintenance, modernization and investment; control and monitor the
lifecycle of critical systems and equipment, including standardization and updating
corporate instruments with key indicators that can allow conducting lifecycle monitoring;
develop and implement optimal modes for its hydro resources and electricity generation;
develop an information stream for data in its hydroelectricity operations; and conduct
technical audits and inspections of subsidiaries.
Inadequate Control Actions:
The state holding was built and operated as a top-down corporation. There seemed to be a
mismatch between declared goals and the company's Key Performance Indicators (KPI)
that were approved by Board of Directors of the Company (RuStocks.com, October 31,
2008). Until 2009 RusHydro's KPI were focused on the company's financial and economic
effectiveness. Salary, non-monetary benefits, and management bonuses were based on
meeting KPI (RusHydro, 2009).
"KPI performance calculation and assessment are carried out in accordance with
RusHydro's Procedure for KPI Performance Calculation and Assessment approved by a
resolution of RusHydro's Board of Directors on 26.09.2008 (Minutes No. 62) with
subsequent amendments (resolutions by RusHydro's Board of Directors on 24.12.2008
(Minutes No. 69) and on 11.05.2010 (Minutes No. 97)." (RusHydro, December 24, 2008)
It was not possible to find the 2008 KPI Procedures (Minutes No. 62). However, from a
secondary source we may conclude that these KPI Procedures did not include reliability
and safety issues (Council of Federation, 2009b). At the end of 2008, the Board made a
decision to acquire civil liability insurance for operators of hazardous industrial facilities
and hydro generating installations (RusHydro, December 24, 2008). Basically the Board
made financial decisions to mitigate possible and/or emerging engineering problems.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
The holding was established in 2004 as a spinoff from Russia's energy monopoly as the
result of deregulation reforms. It manages 20 branches and 48 other subsidiaries.
Introduction of corporate management emphasizes centralization of financial flows as the
holding's major goal of increasing market value. Market value is the company's key
measurement of success. As of July 3, 2009 the group's market capitalization was USD 10
billion. By the end of 2009 the total installed hydropower capacity was 25,336.6 Megawatt.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
Geographical dispersion of RusHydro's assets and infrastructure are the company's most
obvious challenges. Regional and engineering differences made it difficult to impose
comprehensive standards on all holding sites. Its hydropower plants are different in size,
age, power generation and relation to downstream consumers of electricity. There were
also differences in regional priorities. For example, infrastructure in Siberia is relatively
modern compared to Russia's other regions and demands a unique approach given the fact
that RusHydro stakeholder's (RUSAL's) major assets are located in the Siberian region. The
priorities that the Board had to face were aimed at new mega projects in Siberia rather
than maintaining existing infrastructure.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
In 2008 Standard & Poor published its Corporate Governance Score on RusHydro.
According to this report the company had CGS-5+ or "moderate corporate governance
processes and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard &
Poor's opinion, weaknesses in several of the major areas of governance analysis"
(Standard&Poors, 2008).
The report stressed a number of weaknesses, which did not include issues of safety or
reliability, but rather concerns about government interference in the company's business:
1. There are risks that the government may require RusHydro to engage in
commercially unattractive projects that serve strategic and social goals. These risks
are only partially compensated by the presence of a constructive dialogue between
the company and minority shareholders.
2. The board of RusHydro does not include a significant independent element, which
limits its ability to mitigate risks associated with the government's influence
(Standard&Poors, 2008).
In the corporate culture there is a general understanding that technical regulations and
safety issues are "administrative barriers" for efficient operations. Whereas maintenance
and capital repair was perceived from a purely financial planning perspective, rather than
with regard to the technological lifecycle.









































































4.7 Seventh Level Operations: Siberian Inter-Regional Office FSETAI
Safety Requirements and Constraints:
Three Federal Laws guide the Federal Service's activities in the electricity generation
sector: The Law on Industrial Safety (Russian Federation, 1997) (Articles 9 and 10) lists a
wide range of requirements for organizations and personnel that operate hazardous
facilities. It also outlines readiness measures for containing possible emergencies.
The office conducts technical and other inspections in nine major areas, including the
safety of power systems and of hydro technical structures. The Siberian Inter-Regional
Office was created in 2004 as part of program of the constitutional reforms that introduced
Federal districts, an intermediate administrative structure between regions and Moscow.
Inadequate Control Actions:
There are two other Federal Laws that regulate activities of hydropower stations: The Law
on Safety of Hydro Technical Installations, and The Electricity Energy Law. The Law on
Safety of Hydro Technical Installations addresses safety of hydroelectric power stations,
spillways, water outlet structures, etc.; it is enforced by the Ministry of Natural Resources.
Additionally, the Electricity Energy Law (Russian Federaion, 2003) covers issues of
operational licensing, operational-dispatch structure, and government regulation of the
electricity market. It is in the domain of the Ministry of Energy. In addition, the Federal
Audit Chamber investigates activities of state-run companies and federal government-
funded projects (Beskhmelnitsyn, 2009).
Due to such legal overlap, federal inspectors rarely exercise their authority to stop
production processes. Inspection results can be challenged through Federal offices or
courts. Inspections can be conducted only on annual basis; some findings are made in the
form of recommendations.
Context in Which Decisions Are Made:
The Siberian Inter-Regional Office watches over 12,210 businesses and organizations
which manage hazardous industrial facilities, 329,511 electricity consumers, 138,958
heating energy consumers, 127 hydro technical structures, 11,029 facilities that are subject
of environmental monitoring.
Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and flawed decisions, leading to erroneous
control actions:
Two hydro power stations and the Siberian Dispatch center were under the authority of
three different sub regional inspection units of the Federal Service. Thus, until the accident,
the possibility of a complex, multi-party failure was not considered a hazardous scenario.
More importantly, inspectors did not inspect hydro turbine units since they were not
categorized as hazardous industrial facilities. In 2007, the Federal Audit Chamber's
Analysis of the Impact of Investment Programs of The Electricity Energy Sector pointed out
that the "wear of certain types of hydraulic equipment - hydraulic turbines, hydro
generators and hydro - exceeded 60% and reached a critical level" (Beskhmelnitsyn, 2009).
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However, technical modernization was addressed as an investment problem that RusHydro
had to solve with increased state and internal investment.
Reasons for flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions:
The station's design and possible flaws derived from the design were not subject to
revision. Power Management and Process Control System (and interaction between several
facilities) was never considered a hazard and never inspected as one complex system. We
cannot say that modernization was not in RusHydro's agenda. However, problems of
aligning infrastructure had to compete with new infrastructural projects (such as the
construction of the Boguchansk Hydro Power Station) for funding and wait in the holding's
"investment queue."
As we mentioned previously, corporate culture frequently perceived technical inspections
as bureaucratic and administrative barriers to efficient operations. Such issues had to be
fixed quickly, using shortcuts rather than long-term solutions.





































Chapter 5. Socio-Technical Landscape and Systemic Factors
"The only relevant learning in a company is the learning done by those people
who have the power to act" (Arie P.De Geus).
The goal of this chapter is to briefly describe the evolution of the Soviet-and, later,
Russia'- electricity sector before and after 2000. For this purpose I will present two
causal-loop diagrams comparing and contrasting Soviet central planning environment and
the market-driven environment of present Russia.
I will identify, describe and compare the key dynamics of interest to this research.
Unfortunately the scope and availability of data do not allow building an actual system
dynamics model. Such a model will require extensive research capabilities that are
presently unavailable.
In this chapter I also will map decision-making and legislative processes in Russia; the
evolution of the regional governments' role in public utility management; the fundamental
role of the electricity generation sector in Russia's economy; an overview of ten years of
liberalization reforms in the sector, and its future perspectives; and delays resulting from
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Figure 12: Central Planning
In one paragraph this history can be summarized as evolution from (1) the central planning
and rapid industrialization of the first half of the twentieth century; (2) to expansion,
overinvestment and misinvestment of the second half of the twentieth century, (3) to
unsystematic privatization and chaotic liberalization of an undermanaged infrastructure
from1992-2008.
From a technical perspective, evolution of the system has been broken down into four
functional elements: Generation, Transmission, Distribution, Supply and Tariff-setting
regime. Later in this chapter I will present more a detailed overview of this transition. Let
us start with the Central planning environment.
5.1 Central Planning: Controlled Environment of the Past
The electricity generation sector, which is the backbone of the Soviet economy, remained
the country's most reliable industry. The system dynamics causal loop diagram describes
key variables of that model in more details. Let us look at the four major causal loops in the
diagram:
Government Driven Electricity Output Growth
The State was the primary force that pushed demand for electricity and investment into its
infrastructure. Five-year development plans, driven by the political priorities of the
Communist Party, set the stage for the nation's Industrial Development, or what we call
Government Plan for Industrial Output. Execution of the Government's plan led to an
increased Electricity Demand and required an increase in Electricity Output. In those
instances where existing capacities did not satisfy growing demand, Capital Investment into
Electricity Generating Assets had to be made. This process led to increase in Capacity and
Volume of Electricity Generation, and reinforced increase in Industrial Output (see figure
below).
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Figure 13: Government Driven Electricity Output Growth
Overstretching Government Resources
The Government Plan for Industrial Output led to an increase in the Number of Investment
Projects. This increase led to competition for limited resources among administrative
regions, state industries, ministries and projects. With the increase in the Number of
Investment Projects (nation-wide projects), Government Funding per Investment Project
dropped.
Capital Investment into Electricity Generation Assets had to be stretched over time and
space. In the case of SSHPS, the total time of station construction took twenty-seven years
(start in 1963, testing mode in 1978, full functional mode 2000) (Rostekhnadzor, 2009).
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Figure 14: Overstretching Government Resources
Compromises in the quality or completeness of the original design led to decreases in
Safety and Reliability of Electricity Supply. As mentioned in Chapter 3, prior to the 2009
accident, SSHPS had experienced three major (and several minor) accidents, most of which
were related to seasonal flooding. These problems could have been avoided with the
operation of the alternative spillway. The spillway could have given immediate and long-
term backing to SSHPS at the time of the latest accident. After the accident the water had to
be discharged through an emergency spillway, which affected the structural integrity of the
station's dam.
Due to financial difficulties the construction of the alternative spillway was started only in
2005. At the time of the 2009 accident it was not yet completed. An emergency discharge
through an alternative shore spillway could have helped localize the accident in a shorter
period of time. Two months after the accident, the Russia's Prime Minister allocated 115
million USD to complete the spillway (RIA Novosti, September 8, 2009).
Rigidity of Technical Regulations Ensures Safety and Reliability
In Chapter 2, I gave a brief overview of the Reliability Theory school in the Soviet Union
that had to satisfy the development of Soviet civil and military industrial complex. In our
diagram, the Rigidity of Technical Regulation comes about as the result of Government's
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Figure 15: Rigidity of Technical Regulations Ensures Safety and Reliability
In our particular example of the Siberian Regional Energy Grid System, a stable and reliable
supply to aluminum and other smelters was vital for the national economy. Increase in
Volume of Electricity Generation resulted in higher industrial output. The stability of
industrial output, and the upward dynamics of its volume, stressed the importance of
Electricity System Safety and Reliability for the national economy.
On the left side of the main loop, we can see two other important variables. Rigidity of
Technical Regulation pressured Soviet management to allocate the necessary Maintenance
Budget, which in its turn led to an increase in the actual maintenance work conducted for
the sake of safety and reliability.
1.4 Timely Maintenance Ensures Sustainability of the Infrastructure
The last but not least important loop of the model of the Russia's electricity sector is its
sustainability loop, in which Capacity Utilization increased Depreciation of the Electricity
Generation Assets and subsequently the need for maintenance. All other things being equal,
we assume that the need in maintenance led to higher safety and reliability through
increases in Maintenance Budget and Actual Maintenance Of Assets.
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Figure 16: Timely Maintenance Ensures Sustainability of the Infrastructure
Of course if one would like to make the model more complex, it can be argued that, with the
constant expansion of the electricity sector, the government had to decide whether to
spend money on maintenance or capital investment. Moreover, expanded infrastructure
requires increases in maintenance budget, in which internal completion leads to an
overstretching of resources. The same dynamics as described in 5.2, above, concerning
Overstretching Government Resources, with the difference that instead of capital
investment one can plug-in the maintenance budget.
So by combining these four major causal loops we have a model that is characterized by
heavy government intervention in priority formulation and interest in high industrial
output, as well as high capital and maintenance investment and rigid technical regulations.
The model's major flaw is that when politically driven goals and priorities are not under
control, model dynamics could lead to the system's overexpansion (overinvestment). This
in turn places additional burden on existing projects in terms of maintenance, and on
projects under construction in terms of completion and completeness.
The extent of the transition process of Russia's electricity sector (1992-2008) is so broad,
that it could distract us from the main purpose of this chapter. The chronology and key
facts of the transition are given as an attachment at the end of the chapter.
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5.2 Formation of Hybrid System
Let us now look at the current state of Russia's electricity sector. In order to make the
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Figure 17: Hybrid System of Russia's Electricity Sector
Dynamics of Electricity Price
Market Price for
Aluminum




+ Price - Demand
Dynamics Costs of AluminumDemand for ProductionElectricity +
Price for Government
Electricity - Regulation (Tariffs)
Figure 18: Dynamics of the Electricity Price
In our model Price for Electricity is one of the critical elements of the equation. Electricity
generated by the hydroelectric station plays a critical role in the cost structure of the
aluminum production-the lower is the price of electricity, the more competitive
aluminum is on the global market. Aluminum cost is directly connected to RUSA L's
Profitability.
Another important (but external to our model) variable that can decrease the Cost of
Aluminum Production is Effective Cost Improvement Measures. However, improvements are
usually costly and time-consuming vis-A-vis water discharge at a hydropower plant.
Market Pricefor Aluminum and Demandfor Aluminum are two interdependent variables. In
a market economy Demandfor Aluminum dictates Demandfor Electricity, in its turn
electricity demand determines Pricefor Electricity.
In the Hybrid Model we have the co-existence of market and non-market factors. In this
particular loop, we have Government Regulation in the form of tariffs for electricity
generation and transmission that cap the price for electricity for its own reasons, which
could range from goals such as increasing GDP or the employment of workers at aluminum
smelters.
Capping the cost of electricity actually helps to increase RUSAL's profits, which in its turn
could help RUSAL achieve its investment obligation towards the Russian government to
build new Boguchansk HSP (RIA Novosti, August 2, 2010).
Capital investment Loop
In the Hybrid Model, the state steps down from maintaining Safety and Reliability. It now
becomes the responsibility of the semi-governmental/semi-private holding (RusHydro).
RusHydro management paid attention to issues of safety based on their awareness of the
Number and Scope ofAccidents, i.e. the higher the number of accidents and the larger the
scope of such accidents, the greater the Management Attention to Safety and Reliability.
RusHydro is a young holding (established in 2004) which manages 20 branches and 48
other subsidiaries spread across Russia's climatic zones. These sites are different in
capacity, technological maturity and their numbers of electricity consumers. The holding
has integrated different entities that were never part of a single technological process. As a
result, the holding's Moscow-based headquarters have a short institutional memory when
it comes to safety and reliability. Lack of attention from headquarters resulted in low
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Figure 19: Capital Investment Loop
Maintenance Backlog
One of the key concepts of the model is Maintenance Backlog. As technology matures, it
requires more maintenance. For example, Rostekhnadzor in its Official Investigation
Report stated that the lifetime of each turbine is 30 years. After 20 years of operation, the
average of operating time of each SSHPS turbine is about 85,000 working hours. When a
turbine reaches its 50,000-hour horizon, the necessary maintenance work has to be
repeated after every 9,000-10,000 hours (Rostekhnadzor, 2009).
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Figure 20: Maintenance Backlog
In this diagram we see that time (Asset Maturity) and electricity volume increase Required
Maintenance, which results in increased stock that we named Maintenance Backlog. If Asset
Maturity is an external variable, in some sense a legacy that the company has to deal with,
Volume of Electricity Generation is a variable that can be externally controlled by the
holding, which can actually generate economic gains and thus funds for maintenance.
In our model we connect Volume of Electricity Generation to revenues and eventually to
RusHydro's Revenues. In order for backlog to decrease, RusHydro has to allocate more funds
for its Maintenance Budget.
However, there is also an important variable that we call the Board of Director's Restriction
on Cost. A board of directors that represents both government and private (RUSAL)
interests has its own expectations of RusHydro's operating costs. Moreover, at the end of
2008, the board made a financial decision to mitigate possible and/or emerging
engineering problems by purchasing civil liability insurance for operators of hazardous
industrial facilities and owners of hydro generating installations. (RusHydro, December 24,
2008)
Moreover, increase in Actual Maintenance inevitably leads to increased Cost of Electricity
Generation, which in its turn leads to a drop in profit margins for RusHydro and requires
the Pricefor Electricity to go up.
Connecting Maintenance Backlog with Safety and Reliability
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Figure 21: Connecting Maintenance Backlog with Safety and Reliability
Asset Maturity and Actual Maintenance are two variables that connect Maintenance Backlog
with Safety and Reliability. Decrease in capital investment over time results in higher
maturity of the infrastructure. The higher the maturity, the lower the Safety and Reliability.
Asset Maturity is the cause for Required Maintenance to increase over time.
If we assume that Maintenance Backlog is a bathtub with inflow (Required Maintenance)
and outflow (Actual Maintenance), there must be a critical level of maintenance work that
will not allow any more accumulation of the backlog. At this point in my research I
understand that this is a critical issue for which I do not have a clear and convincing
explanation. However, it seems that an organization's migration from a safe to an unsafe
state takes place with the increase of maintenance backlog.
As Government Attention to Electricity System's Safety and Reliability decreases so does the
Rigidity of Technical Regulations. From Chapter 3 we know that the Law on Technical
Regulations has not yet established a follow-up regulatory framework, while the old Soviet
technical regulations were reclassified from "required" to "recommended" mode. In the
next diagram I will also illustrate the difference between short- and long-term management
goals. Together with the Number and Scope ofAccidents, these four variables define
Management Attention to Safety and Reliability.
Short Term vs. Long Term Goal of the Management
Management Attention to Safety and Reliability is affected by management's goals. But let us
first start with RusHydro's profitability, which defines Management Compensation. Portions
of this compensation can be related to financial performance and safety. The ratio of
compensation to profitability and safety is another important differentiator.
Board of Director's
(Government+RunAl)
restrctions on RusHydros costs
-RusHydro's 
Rsvr'Maintenance Budget usHydros Revenue from
Revenue Electricity Generation
Minte ance
Menuianc Actual Maintenance Cost of Electricity





R e lia b ilit v + 
- "
Capital Investment to
Number and scope Improve Safeit and
of acidets RliablitxPortion of Compensation
Other Capital Related to Safety and
Inv estment Reliability
Portion of Capital +
Management A tention Expenditure for Safetyg +
to Safchv and Reliabitirs and Retiabiltie Management
Compensation Related to
+ Safet and Reliability
+ A yet +
Management Focus Management Portion of
on Long Term Goals Compensation Related + Compensation Related
Magement Focus on to Profitability to Proftability
Short Term oso
Figure 22: Short Term vs. Long Term Goal of the Management
As we saw in Chapter 3, RusHydro's KPI policy was, until 2010, focused on the company's
financial and economic effectiveness; it did not include reliability and safety issues (Council
of Federation, 2009b).
In this diagram I argue that the higher the proportion of compensation related to safety and
reliability, the higher the Management Compensation Related to Safety and Reliability, the
result being that management tends to focus on longer-term goals. On the contrary, the
lower the portion of compensation related to safety and reliability, the higher the
Management Compensation Related Profitability, the result being management focus on
short-term goals. Management focus on long-term goals tends to increase the Management
Attention to Safety and Reliability, and vice versa.
Summarizing key characteristics of the Hybrid System's causal-loop diagram we can
conclude that this system's price dynamics are defined by a demand for electricity that
drives prices up and government regulations that caps prices at levels reflecting
government interest in the national economy.
Capital investment and maintenance are two crucial dynamics that can keep the number
and scope of accidents at a low level. Continuous capital investment increases safety and
reliability. Maintenance Backlog is stock with Required Maintenance as inflow and Actual
Maintenance as outflow. High-level backlog is the result of slow outflow of actual
maintenance, which results in decreased levels of safety and reliability.
It seems that the migration of an organization from a safe to an unsafe state takes place
with an increase in maintenance backlog. Additional analysis has to be conducted to prove
this conclusion.
5.3 Brief Overview of the Transition Period
"In the 1990s electricity production in Russia declined significantly because of the shut-
down of several nuclear reactors, the fall in demand following the 1998 financial crisis and
the consequent drop in the country's power generating capacity. However, the subsequent
economic recovery contributed to an increase in total electricity consumption from
approximately 809 terawatt-hours in 1998 to approximately 1,001 terawatt-hours in 2007.
Today, thermal power (oil, natural gas and coal) accounts for roughly 63 per cent of
Russia's electricity generation, followed by hydropower (21 per cent) and nuclear (16 per
cent)" (Doeh, Wood, Popov, Fominykh, & Mouratova, 2008).
Russia's economic recovery contributed to an increase in total electricity consumption,
from 715 billion kWh in 1998 to 980 billion kWh in 2007. Fossil-fuel power (oil, natural
gas, and coal-fired) accounts for about 63% of electricity generation, followed by
hydropower (21%) and nuclear (16%), according to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration. According to state data, these plants produced 913 billion kWh in 2007.
Russia's power sector has a total generation capacity of 217 GW and includes over 440
thermal and hydropower plants, 77 of which are coal-fired, and 31 nuclear power stations.
Some capacity in the far-eastern part of the country is not connected to the power grid.
Post-liberalization, the state retains ownership of system operator and transmission
controller, Federal Grid Company, through its stake of 75% or more. It also maintains total
ownership of the nuclear sector through the existing state agency RosAtom and its mining,
fuel handling, construction and operating arms. The Interregional Distribution Company
and the Hydro OGK remain under the government's control by virtue of its minimum 52%
ownership of each, a similar position to that of the supply companies in which it always
retains a minimum 51% stake.
The Russian electricity market is, in my opinion, one of the most complex electricity
markets due to its geographical distribution and historical background. The big picture is
further complicated by two additional factors:
1. The combined generation of electricity and heating energy, which adds a social
component to the operating systems.
2. Unsystematic privatization of the electricity sector on the regional and municipal
levels between 1991 and 1998. By social component I mean harsh climate and
coupling of the electricity and thermo power infrastructures.
It took 10 years for the RAO UES to consolidate its transmission assets as federal property
using complicated swaps in assets and equity with privately owned companies.
In Russia the loss of energy accounts for 40% of total consumption-a fact that is to a great
extent caused by very low energy prices, which make energy-saving efforts unprofitable.
Energy price increases, and the introduction of more severe energy saving regulations,
remain politically unpopular. The Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian
Federation estimates the investments needed for energy saving projects up until 2010 to
be worth USD 50-70 billion (Swiss Business Hub Russia, 2008).
As a result, optimization of network losses is not high on the priority list of the Russian
energy sector management. Currently the biggest and most visible loss to local power
generators is that of heating energy supplied to municipalities at "social" cost. The Federal
regulator and its regional offices regulate the price of heating. The heating infrastructure
(mainly hot water pipelines) is on the balance sheets of generating companies. Social price
caps imposed by regulators make the modernization of this infrastructure economically
infeasible for generating companies.
In short, the public's deep sensitivity to price increases, as well as its distrust of sector
management (the belief that that additional surpluses will be directed by the management
towards modernization) makes any price increase politically unpopular. Regulators in turn
resort to administrative methods of capping electricity prices..
Transmission and Distribution
There are seven separate regional power systems in the Russian electricity sector:
Northwest, Centre, Middle Volga, North Caucasus, Urals, Siberia, and Far East. The Far East
region is the only one not connected to an integrated power system. Until 2007/8 UES,
which is 52% owned by the government (Gazprom has a 10% stake), owned 96% of the
T&D system, the central dispatch unit, and the federal wholesale electricity market
(FOREM). The grid comprises almost 2 million miles of power lines, 93,000 miles of which
are high-voltage cables over 220 kV. The former UES structure passed to the NGC in July
2008
Legal base for the Electricity market in Russia
The legal framework of Russia's electricity policy and the power sector's institutional
structure is defined by the Federal Law on the Electricity Industry (the Electricity Law)
dated 26 March 2003. In 2003 and 2007 amendments to the Electricity Law were
introduced to expedite power industry reforms, introduce market instruments in the sector
and reorganize Russia's state-owned electricity monopoly RAO UES. On the level of state
monopoly, RAO UES adopted a restructuring plan called "The Concept of RAO UES Strategy
for 2003-2008" (the "5+5" Plan; May 29, 2003) (RAO UES), with the strategic goal of
completing market deregulation by 2008. As of July 1, 2008 RAO UES ceased to exist.
Article 3 of the Electricity Law separates consumers of electricity and heat energy (both
individual consumers and business) from consumers of capacity (entities that acquire
capacity for its internal needs and/or onward sale).
Among other elements of the market, the article also defines:
- Load-controlled electric power consumers: significant consumers that influence the
quality of electricity and reliability of Russia's United Energy Power System.
* Co-generation of electric and thermal power: a mode of operation of thermoelectric
power plants in which electric power generation is directly related to simultaneous
generation of thermal power. This is a key characteristic of the social impact of the
electricity infrastructure.
* Guaranteeing electric power supplier (guaranteeing supplier): a commercial
organization that is obligated in accordance with this Federal Law, or voluntarily-
assumed obligations, to make an electric power purchase contract with any
customer who requests it to do so, or with a person acting on behalf of and in the
interests consumers who desires to purchase electric power;
Distributed generation: Separation into Wholesale and Retail Markets
Article 35 of the Electricity Law defines the requirement for legal entities to participate in
the Wholesale market. According to the article, electricity consumers can participate in
both Wholesale and Retail markets.
Key components of the Wholesale market:
* Bilateral Contract market
* Day-ahead Spot Market
e Intra-day Balancing Market
The Wholesale market is self-regulated by the Market Council (a non-profit organization),
which decides on granting and/or depriving the right to trade on the Wholesale market, as
well as defining trading rules and regulations (Article 33 of the Electricity Law). The
representative of the Executive branch of the Federal Government in the Market Council
has a veto power. The Council has 8 members from the Legislative and Executive branches
of the Federal Government, four representatives from each of the three groups - (1) sellers
of electricity, (2) buyers of electricity, and (3) representatives of commercial and
technological infrastructures.
The Wholesale market is made up of three energy generation levels:
1. Generating capacities that provide reliability of the power system and nuclear
power plants.
2. Thermal power stations with combined electricity and heating production.
Hydropower plans that require the generation of certain levels of electricity due to
their technological and environmental requirements.
3. Other participants of the Wholesale market that assumed legal obligations to
provide electricity to wholesale consumers.
Retail market (Article 37):
* Consumers of electricity
e Suppliers of electricity: electricity retail organizations, guaranteed suppliers,
electricity generating companies that are not permitted to participate in the
Wholesale market
e Regional (territorial) transmission companies responsible for electricity
transmission
* Organizations that provide operational & dispatching functions at the Retail market
level.
Commercial law is the legal basis for the Retail market's daily operation. The Government
regulates the rules for guaranteed suppliers, their standard contract procedures and
operational/geographic limits.
Article 40 of the law requires the supplier of services to provide their end-consumers with
a list of unbundled costs (cost of electricity generation, cost of transmission, cost of other
services).
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
"False conceptions are exaggerated modes of thought that do not accord with
thefacts. Even if an object - an event, a person, or any other phenomenon - has
a slightly favorable aspect, once the object is mistakenly seen as existing totally
from its own side, true and real, mental projection exaggerates its goodness
beyond what it actually is" (Dalai Lama).
In my conclusion I will elaborate three major topics: (1) abstract description of the
accident, (2) comparison of traditional vs. System Theory Approach, (3) summarizing and
understanding the accident from system theory approach.
6.1 Abstract concept of the accident
A straightforward recitation of the events leading to the Sayano-Shushenskaya
Hydroelectric Power Station accident gives us an incomplete picture of its causes. And
while the System Theory approach provides a nuanced and informative explanation for the
accident, its complexity of detail does not lend itself easily to quick summary. So rather
than relying on either approach to give the reader an overview of the accident, let me
briefly abstract the accident, mapping five key components that can help us understand the
accident. These five components are Water, Structure, Machine, Power, and Human.
Water
The seasonal flooding that had previously caused three major accidents at the station was
not the cause of this particular accident. However, during the accident, headwater spinning
from the turbine rotor destroyed the turbine room, flooded the station, and drowned
personnel. After the accident, the water level rose, requiring emergency discharge from the
SSHPS and its sister Mainsk HPS downstream. Absence of an emergency discharge spillway
created long-term challenges for the station as ice build-up increased pressure on the
SSHPS's structure.
Structure
The structure of the station's dam remained intact immediately after the accident and
through the cold winter following the accident, when water from emergency discharge
created ice build-up on the dam. The strength of the structure-historically a source of
station management concern-was not an issue at that time. However, the station's
original design did not include an alternative power source to allow closing the upper valve
automatically. This feature would have allowed for discharge of water from the flooded
station several hours sooner. There were no emergency exits below the watermark in the
foundation's structure to allow station personnel to evacuate safely. Turbine room design
does not historically provide a separate compartment for each turbine.
Machine
The station's turbines were almost 30 years old. Average operating history of each turbine
was about 85,000 working hours. The oldest turbine had a flaw in its original design; it
received an inadequate overhaul six months prior to the accident (March 2009). The
turbine's design flaw included an intermediate unsafe generation mode between two safe
modes on each side of the spectrum. The two safe zones were: Load Zone 1: from 0 to
265Megawatt and Load Zone 3: from 570 to 640 Megawatt. The unsafe zone was Load Zone
2: from 265 to 570 megawatts. Operation in unsafe mode led to increased turbine
vibration. The turbine's design flaw required the operator to pass unsafe mode as quickly
as possible. Between March and August of 2009, Turbine 2 operated outside the accepted
limits 210 times, for a total of 2520 seconds.
Turbine modernization in early 2009 included introduction of a management system of
individual servomotors, which provided individual hydraulic actuators for individual
turbine blades. Vibration sensors on the turbines, however, were inserted inadequately,
and did not provide operators with complete information. None of the three layers of
"turbine defense" - their 31 safety functions - were directly related to increases in turbine
vibration and did not cause emergency shutdown of the turbine. As a result of the accident
all 10 turbines of the station were damaged to different degrees.
Power
The design purpose of the SSHPS was to generate reliable power and maintain the stability
of a large regional grid system. Two basic methods to ensure a high quality of electrical
supply are:"(1) proper use of automatic voltage and frequency control methods and (2)
employing large, interconnected, power systems which, by their very nature, are less
susceptible to load variation and other disturbances" (Machowski, Bialek & Bumby, 2008).
There was a power disruption on the regional grid level that had to be stabilized by
increased power generation at SSHPS. The operator at the Siberian Unified Grid System
Dispatch had an incomplete picture of the dispatch process at the time when he sent
dispatch commands to the SSHPS. The load fluctuation he assumed was to be taken by the
6.4-gigawatts power station was sent to the oldest - and defective - turbine, with one tenth
of the station's installed capacity. During the last eight hours of operation (August 17,
2009), the load at Turbine 2 fluctuated between 0 and 610 MW. It operated in the Load
Zone 2 between 07:46 and 08:13 (from 610MW to 605MW, to 575MW, to 475MW)
(Rostekhnadzor, 2009).
Turbine 2 had been experiencing vibration anomalies, but such anomalies had become a
commonly accepted risk, especially at the time of power disturbance on the regional grid
level. Despite frantic attempts to slow the Turbine 2, at the moment of the accident it was
generating 475 MW.
Human
There were about 300 hundred people at the station at the time of the accident. 75 people
(25% of those present at the station) died. The population of Cheryomushki, hometown to
the station's employees, was just 9000 people. In other words, there were for 8 funerals for
every thousand residents. The combined population of the closest cities and villages
downstream from the station was 50,000. Had a broken dam resulted in a tidal wave
casualties would have been enormous. This is the human scale of the accident.
Could the lives of these 75 people been saved? In my opinion, the lives of at least 65 non-
core personnel that did not have to be at the station could have been saved had station
management ordered a partial evacuation. Management attempt to avoid "airing dirty linen
in public" was obvious even right after the accident, when federal emergency services
received an initial report of only minor flooding of the station.
Interface between Machine, Power and Human
Of the five key components, the most intense interaction was between Machine, Power and
Human. On the abstract level, the interaction of these three components is a source of
complexity. In our case, the interface that allowed such interaction to occur was the Group
Regulator for Active and Reactive Powers (GRARM). GRARM had two major goals (1) Active
power regulation, which represented power actually transmitted and (2) Reactive power
and voltage regulation, which was related to power going back and forth without any net
energy.
At the time of GRARM development, the system requirement of GRARM did not include (1)
criteria to form functional priorities for turbines operating under GRARM, (2) individual
load limits and unsafe mode regimes for each turbine, (3) individual characteristics and
structure of each turbine. GRARM had no safety functions. The system was not mandatory,
and SSHPS could have operated with GRARM turned off.
6.2 Traditional view
Now that we've reviewed the accident's five key components, and identified its source of
complexity, let us review the traditional framework through which this accident was
perceived and assessed. On the left side of the graph below we have Mental Models,
Changing Borders of the System and System Legacy. This is the baggage of knowledge and
experience that we usually carry when we assess an accident. In the middle we have a
Chain of Events, the logical and chronological flow of facts. On the right side we have a list
of actions and reactions that we typically take in the aftermath of an accident. In this









Figure 23: Traditional View of Accidents
Mental models
Traditionally we approach any accident with the baggage of previous knowledge and
experience. Very often such baggage is built upon a theoretical approach. In accidents, such
theoretical approach has long been the Reliability Theory, which focuses solely on internal
characteristics of individual sub-components of a system.
Changing borders of the system
The system border changes over time due to its evolution and adjustment to the external
environment. What was once safe may no longer be safe due to external factors. In the case
of the SSHPS, continuous reform of Russia's electricity sector (which included chaotic
privatization, partial price liberalization and, later, different forms of corporate
consolidation) presented a long list of factors affecting station safety and reliability.
Moreover, such structural challenges were among the first causes that both the
investigators and the public were quick to blame for the accident.
System Legacy
System legacy presents recorded, irrefutable facts. Together with our mental models,
system legacy is at the core of our assessment of a system. At the SSHPS, system legacy was
a critical factor. SSHPS's integration within the Siberian Regional Energy Grid System, and
importance to two aluminum-processing plants, defined the behavior of SSHPS owners and
managers. Moreover, the unique legacy of the Soviet electricity system, including its
System
Mental
coupling with thermo energy sources due to Russia's harsh weather conditions, was a key
driver behind government regulation of electricity prices.
Chain of Events
As we investigate an accident, a specific sequence of events shapes post-factum
interpretation. It connects events in a specific post-factual manner-what Sidney Dekker
calls "tunnel vision" (Dekker, 2006). The tunnel-vision explanation oversimplifies the
history of the accident with linear logical flow and binary (right and wrong) choices. It
oversimplifies the causality of events as well. As a result, hindsight prevents us from
differentiating between what was known after the accident and what was known prior to
and during the accidents.
Culture of Blame
In the aftermath of an accident, blame is a natural element of human and organizational
behavior. The chain-of-events explanation requires people and organizations to
comprehend and simplify an event, as well as identify a cause or an error, intentional or
unintentional, to serve as a logical explanation. Whether it's a fire at a neighboring power
station, a defective turbine, a flawed managerial decision or ill-conceived economic
reforms, the culture of blame focuses attention on particular errors, rather than the
systemic failures, as an explanation for an accident (Dekker, 2006).
Focus on Reliability and Responsibility
What lessons does an organization take away from assigning blame for an accident? Its
management wants to increase the reliability of machinery and infrastructure. Lack of time
and financial resources frequently preclude the necessary drastic changes. Perfunctory
changes only reinforce complacency and a state of denial.
Punishment of the unlucky few who happened to be in close proximity to an accident
nurtures fear, mistrust and indecision within an organization. This dynamics demands
reflective reevaluation and a clarification of responsibilities within an organization.
Modernization
In those instances when lessons learned from an accident lead to deeper reevaluation,
issues of modernization seem to address the problem in the long-term. In the three months
following the SSHPS accident the Russian government signed decrees on Russia's Energy
Strategy 2030; Design and Programs for the Perspective Development of Electricity;
Appraisal of the Cost and Payments for Services of Operational Dispatch Management; and
Amendments to Regulation of the Wholesale Market.
However, some scholars believe that "under specific Russian circumstances today, a
modernization today may lead to negative results. This is because none of the
modernization programs currently being discussed take into account the real causes of
Russia's backwardness" (Gaddy & Ickes, 2010). They are: [1] spatial allocation of physical
and human capital over a vast and cold territory and [2] rent addition to Russia's
commodities export, namely oil and gas, but aluminum as well. "Russia's problem - its
potential bear trap - is that rent addiction serves to sustain the dinosaurs [income from oil
and gas revenue that allows to maintain Russia's inefficient infrastructure]" (Gaddy &
Ickes, 2010).

















Figure 24: System Theory Approach
The System Theory approach gives us a broader understanding of a situation. This
approach categorizes and structures numerous facts in a broader picture, bridging every
fact with an appropriate level of analysis. What makes the SSHPS accident case interesting
and complex is that there are multiple factors that occurred on different hierarchical levels,
and in different points of time, that directly and indirectly steered SSHPS towards the
accident.
On the events level
As the situation emerged, there was an intersection of issues of negligence, lack of proper
training, indecisiveness and shock. Each individual action taken by station personnel made
sense and was part of the routine. It is when one combines these steps that they give us a
more complete picture of the emerging disaster. Turbine 2 was turned into GRARM despite
its known limitations. Personnel did not react to increased vibration, which after six
months of operation became a "routine" anomaly. As the situation emerged, engineers on
duty decided to wait for the Chief Engineer rather than make their own decisions and take
necessary actions to address the problem. The Chief Engineer, who arrived 98 minutes
before the accident, did not order non-essential personnel to evacuate the station. Even as
vibration and control of Turbine 2 became an obvious problem, and personnel attempted
to slow the turbine, 300 people were starting their workday. At the time of the accident, the
alarm system did not signal the emergency situation and or the need to evacuate.
Management was in a state of denial immediately after the accident, and did not inform
authorities about the accident's full extent.
On the Conditions Level
The Conditions Level introduces additional context into our description of the accident. It
can help explain why and how routine decisions by station personnel led to such disastrous
results. Let us review the conditions that I've constructed in this thesis:
e Complex and over-centralized structure of RusHydro, with major focus on corporate
profitability rather than reliability and safety,
e Lack of authority and responsibility on SSHPS managerial level,
e Maturity of station machinery,
* Unstructured and fragmented approach toward modernization and overhaul of
hardware and software at SSHPS,
System requirement gaps and design flaws of the GRARM,
- Introduction of new feature into overhauled Turbine 2,
e Lack of communication between SSHPS and Siberian Unified Grid System Dispatch,
Absence of aggregated vibration data and its integration with safety features,
e Outsourcing of maintenance functions at SSH PS,
e Lack of training for SSHPS's personnel.
These and other conditions that emerged over time were part of daily life at the station.
They produced uncertainties, dilemmas and complexities for station personnel. However,
these conditions over time became an intrinsic feature of the station's daily operation.
On Systemic Factors Level
The SSHPS accident presents an opportunity to look at an existing system from a fresh
perspective. Crisis and its aftermath shed new light on a system's structure. The moment of
an accident alters our subjective sense of time as we begin dividing events into "before"
and "after " categories. Events may be recorded and become part of the "historic record."
Conditions may change and adjust to the situation. Systemic factors, however, are most
likely to remain intact.
These are the systemic factors that were critical in this accident:
e Flaws in the initial design of the SSHPS, particularly of its turbines,
- Rigidity and historical inefficiencies of the Soviet economy and infrastructure, that
advanced spatial misallocation of people and capital in Siberia,
e Reforms of the electricity sector (1992-2008), and segmentation of the integrated
Siberian Energy System into several independent systems, without substantial
capital investment and reevaluation of the operational environment for these
systems,
e The hybrid nature of Russia's electricity sector, which allows co-existence of
elements of both planned and market economies,
- Decrease in the direct role (economic planning) of the government and subsequent
increase in government's indirect (regulatory) obligations for state property
management, market regulations, technical and safety regulations, etc.
- Continuous reliance on old models of economic growth (export of commodities, i.e.
aluminum) and cheap electricity as main engine for competitiveness, without
substantial capital investment into infrastructure,
- Maturity of the infrastructure and accumulation of maintenance work.
Focus on System's Behavior
A broader understanding of this accident widens the scope of lessons that we can take from
it. Rather than solely focusing our attention on improving reliability and responsibility, we
can step one level up and ask how the system will behave in an environment shaped by
given conditions and systemic factors. This system could be RusHydro, SSHPS or any other
larger HPS.
If the operational environment for such hydropower stations does not change, we cannot
expect that fragmented actions will prevent potentially dangerous scenarios. Demand for
cheap electricity as a main cost component of competitive export commodities, generated
by deteriorating infrastructure with limited capital investment, in a hybrid electricity
sector regulated by old Soviet- and market-driven regulations, will inevitably lead to
systemic errors. Such errors might manifest themselves in a form similar to that of the
SSHPS accident. Or they may take other, unexpected, forms.
Socio-technical landscape
In a hybrid socio-technical landscape the roles of government, state enterprise, private
business and civil society are not clearly defined. Their roles fluctuate depending on formal
and informal interests, availability and competition for limited resources, direct and
indirect financial benefits, and internal and external agendas. For example, a hybrid
landscape allows the Russian Prime Minister to use both formal and informal channels to
pressure leadership of Russia's private companies to meet investment obligations. In the
same manner, Russia's private sector may influence the state to regulate price caps for
electricity.
Russia's leadership would like the nation to become a modern and competitive global
player. On one hand, the same leadership sticks to old economic models and perceptions. If
the hybrid nature of Russia's social-technical landscape is a permanent state, government,
private sector and society have to face this reality and work on defining each party's
responsibilities. Clarity on the socio-technical landscape level will eventually help define
lower-level issues that both the state and private sector have to face in their daily
operations. It can help systems such as RusHydro or RUSAL, and entities such as SSHPS or
Bratsk HPS, adapt to a changing environment.
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